Reichenbach on convention

✍ Scribed by Keith Lehrer

• Publisher: Springer Netherlands
• Year: 1977
• Tongue: English
• Weight: 642 KB
• Volume: 34
• Category: Article
• ISSN: 0039-7857
• DOI: 10.1007/bf00485804

✦ Synopsis

Reichenbach articulated and defended a distinction between conventional and factual components within a scientific theory. For example, he argued that the axioms of geometry are factual while the coordinative definitions for geometry are conventional. 1 The scientific spirit with which Reichenbach approached philosophical discussion is illustrated by the manner in which he clarified his doctrine when confronted with criticism. His reply to Einstein represents, I shall argue, a fundamental discovery that refutes both the conventionalism of Poincar6 and Quine's claim that no categorical distinction can be drawn between those statements that are true as a matter of fact and those that are true by convention. I shall conclude with a comparison between Reichenbach's doctrine and a similar one proposed by Carnap.