✦ LIBER ✦

Regulatory Monitoring, Closure Costs and Bank Moral Hazard Behavior

✍ Scribed by Sumon C. Mazumdar

Book ID: 110256679
Publisher: Springer US
Year: 1997
Tongue: English
Weight: 1020 KB
Volume: 12
Category: Article
ISSN: 0922-680X
DOI: 10.1023/a:1007953912853

No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.

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