Regulation meets cornpetition: Antitrust in the new gas distribution industry
✍ Scribed by Michaels, Robert J.
- Publisher
- John Wiley and Sons
- Year
- 2007
- Weight
- 526 KB
- Volume
- 12
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0743-5665
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
✦ Synopsis
ince open access, competitive interstate S markets for gas, transportation, and related services have flourished. Downstream, regulated local distribution company transportation programs are increasing the choices available to end users. As unbundling crosses the city gate, however, so might monopoly. The existence of regulation need not bar antitrust action against LDCs, which may soon face lawsuits with similar economic bases to those that have supported successful antitrust claims elsewhere.
Competition and Regulation
Many statutes and rules ask utility regulators to protect competition where the public interest requires it. Prior to the 1970s, scholars and courts viewed antitrust and regulation as distinct methods for restraining monopoly. Antitrust could control the acquisition and exercise of power in markets where competition was possible, and regulation could set outcomes in those where it was impossible or undesirable. Prior to the 197Os, scholars and courts viewed antitrust and regulation as distinct. . Regulation met antitrust in 1973, when the Supreme Court decided Otter Tail Power Co. zi.
U S . , 410 U.S. 366 (1973). Charged with refusing to transmit power (wheel) for newly formed municipal utilities, the Court found Otter Tail in violation of the Sherman Act and ordered it to wheel. The Court rejected Otter Tail's claim that federal regulation precluded the application of antitrust. In gas, the interplay of regulation and Industry