Reference, Truth and Conceptual Schemes: A Defense of Internal Realism
β Scribed by GΓ‘bor Forrai (auth.)
- Publisher
- Springer Netherlands
- Year
- 2001
- Tongue
- English
- Leaves
- 151
- Series
- Synthese Library 296
- Edition
- 1
- Category
- Library
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
β¦ Subjects
Metaphysics; Philosophy of Language; Epistemology; Philosophy of Science; Philosophy of Mind
π SIMILAR VOLUMES
<p>1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND The purpose of the book is to develop internal realism, the metaphysical-episteΒ mological doctrine initiated by Hilary Putnam (Reason, Truth and History, "Introduction", Many Faces). In doing so I shall rely - sometimes quite heavily - on the notion of conceptual scheme.
The volume presents the material of the first Oxford-Budapest Conference on Truth, Reference and Realism held at CEU in 2005. The problem addressed by the conference, famously formulated by Paul Benacerraf in a paper on Mathematical Truth, was how to understand truth in the semantics of discourses a
<p>The volume presents the material of the first Oxford-Budapest Conference on Truth, Reference and Realism held at CEU in 2005. The problem addressed by the conference, famously formulated by Paul Benacerraf in a paper on Mathematical Truth, was how to understand truth in the semantics of discourse
One of the most important Anglo-American philosophers of our time here joins the current philosophical debate about the nature of truth. William P. Alston formulates and defends a realist conception of truth, which he calls alethic realism (from "aletheia," Greek for "truth"). This idea holds that t