Reconsidering Central Bank Independence
โ Scribed by Stan Du Plessis, Andreas Freytag, Dawie van Lill
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Year
- 2024
- Tongue
- English
- Leaves
- 272
- Category
- Library
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
โฆ Synopsis
Central bank independence has become one of the most widely accepted tenets of modern monetary policy. According to this view, the main role of independent central banks is to maintain price stability through the adjustment of short-term interest rates. Reconsidering Central Bank Independence argues that the global financial crisis has undermined confidence in this view as central banks increasingly have to address concerns other than price stability, such as financial stability, the need for output recovery and other broader policy goals. Large balance-sheet expansion by central banks followed the global financial crisis, which overlapped considerably with the financial policy of their respective governments. Exploring the consequences of this shift to a more diverse set of policy challenges, this book calls for a return to the consensus role for central banks and analyses what this might mean for their future independence.
โฆ Table of Contents
01.0_pp_i_ii_Reconsidering_Central_Bank_Independence
02.0_pp_iii_iii_Reconsidering_Central_Bank_Independence
03.0_pp_iv_iv_Copyright_page
04.0_pp_v_vi_Contents
05.0_pp_vii_viii_Illustrations
06.0_pp_ix_xiii_Preface
07.0_pp_xiv_xv_Acknowledgements
08.0_pp_xvi_xviii_Abbreviations
09.0_pp_1_70_The_Theoretical_Foundations
09.1_pp_3_18_History_of_Central_Banking
09.2_pp_19_37_Focus_on_Inflation
09.3_pp_38_70_The_Political_Economy_of_CBI
10.0_pp_71_150_Balance_Sheet_Operations_in_Different_Times_and_CBI
10.1_pp_73_86_Central_Banks_and_the_Great_Moderation
10.2_pp_87_121_Monetary_Policy_Response_to_the_Financial_Crisis
10.3_pp_122_150_Balance_Sheet_Policies_and_CBI
11.0_pp_151_219_The_Political_Economy_of_CBI_in_the_Real_Economy
11.1_pp_153_195_Fiscal_Needs_and_Low_Interest_Rates_Policy_in_an_Olsonian_Setting
11.2_pp_196_207_Are_Central_Banks_Too_Independent
11.3_pp_208_219_The_Future_of_CBI
12.0_pp_220_242_References
13.0_pp_243_246_Index
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