Rebuilding Leviathan: Party Competition and State Exploitation in Post-Communist Democracies

✍ Scribed by Anna Grzymala-Busse

• Publisher: Cambridge University Press
• Year: 2007
• Tongue: English
• Leaves: 294
• Series: Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics
• Category: Library

✦ Synopsis

Why do some governing parties limit their opportunistic behavior and constrain the extraction of private gains from the state? This analysis of post-communist state reconstruction provides surprising answers to this fundamental question of party politics. Across the post-communist democracies, governing parties have opportunistically reconstructed the state - simultaneously exploiting it by extracting state resources and building new institutions that further such extraction. They enfeebled or delayed formal state institutions of monitoring and oversight, established new discretionary structures of state administration, and extracted enormous informal profits from the privatization of the communist economy. By examining how post-communist political parties rebuilt the state in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia, Grzymala-Busse explains how even opportunistic political parties will limit their corrupt behavior and abuse of state resources when faced with strong political competition.

✦ Table of Contents

Cover......Page 1
Half-title......Page 3
Series-title......Page 5
Title......Page 7
Copyright......Page 8
Dedication......Page 9
Contents......Page 11
Acknowledgments......Page 13
List of Political Party Abbreviations and Acronyms......Page 15
1 Introduction......Page 17
Post-Communist Democratic Parties and the State......Page 18
Shared Motives, Means, and Opportunities......Page 22
Explaining the Variation: Robust Competition......Page 26
Sources of Robust Competition......Page 31
The Mechanisms of Constraint......Page 32
Implications......Page 34
Case Selection......Page 39
Measurement and Data......Page 41
A Roadmap......Page 44
2 Competing for the State......Page 45
Party Strategies of Survival......Page 46
Choosing Exploitation?......Page 56
Competing Explanations......Page 60
The Impact of Competition......Page 65
Robust Competition......Page 74
The Sources of Robust Competition......Page 77
Mechanisms of Constraint......Page 79
Patterns of Competition in Post-Communist Democracies......Page 82
Conclusion......Page 95
3 Developing the Formal Institutions of the State......Page 97
Why Formal Institutions of Oversight Matter......Page 98
Post-Communist Variation......Page 101
Explaining Discretion in Resource Extraction......Page 102
Domestic Determinants......Page 108
Robust Competition and Formal Institutions......Page 112
Patterns of Institution Building......Page 115
Comparing the Czech Republic and Hungary......Page 125
Hungary......Page 127
The Czech Republic......Page 138
Conclusion......Page 148
4 The Expansion of State Administration: Patronage or Exploitation?......Page 149
The Expansion of Post-Communist State Administration......Page 151
Competing Explanations......Page 152
Functional Explanations......Page 161
Societal Demands......Page 162
State Expansion: Discretion and Privatization......Page 163
Discretionary Hiring......Page 165
Privatizing the State: Parastatal and Extrabudgetary Organizations......Page 175
The Impact of Robust Competition: Comparing the Czech Republic and Poland......Page 182
Conclusion......Page 196
5 Privatizing the State: Party Funding Strategies......Page 198
Cartels or Predators?......Page 202
Formal Party Financing......Page 204
Informal Party Financing......Page 209
Impact of Robust Competition......Page 211
Rethinking Party Finances......Page 216
Privatization and Informal Funding......Page 217
Formal State Funding as Exploitation?......Page 229
Conclusion......Page 236
Conclusion......Page 238
Political Parties and the State......Page 239
Studying Party Competition......Page 242
Post-Communist Political and Economic Development......Page 243
A: PEAK PARTY ORGANIZATIONS IN
POST-COMMUNIST DEMOCRACIES,
1990 –2004......Page 245
B: DETERMINING STATE
ADMINISTRATION EMPLOYMENT
AND RATE OF GROWTH......Page 249
Measuring State Administration Employment......Page 252
C: ANCHORING VIGNETTES......Page 258
Preparation, Administration, and Analysis of the Surveys......Page 259
1. [Discretionary provision of government jobs/services]......Page 260
2. [Prevalence of bribery]......Page 261
Bibliography......Page 263
Index......Page 285

✦ Subjects

Политические дисциплины;Политология;Сравнительная политология;