Reasoning: New Essays on Theoretical and Practical Thinking

✍ Scribed by Magdalena Balcerak Jackson

• Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
• Year: 2019
• Tongue: English
• Leaves: 284
• Category: Library

✦ Synopsis

Philosophers have always recognized the value of reason, but the process of reasoning itself has only recently begun to emerge as a philosophical topic in its own right. Is reasoning a distinctive kind of mental process? If so, what is its nature? How does reasoning differ from merely freely associating thoughts? What is the relationship between reasoning about what to believe and reasoning about how to act? Is reasoning itself something you do, or something that happens to you? And what is the value of reasoning? Are there rules for good or correct reasoning and, if so, what are they like? Does good reasoning always lead to justified belief or rational action? Is there more than one way to reason correctly from your evidence? This volume comprises twelve new essays by leading researchers in the philosophy of reasoning that together address these questions and many more, and explore the connections between them.

✦ Table of Contents

Cover
Reasoning: New Essays on Theoretical and Practical Thinking
Copyright
Contents
List of Contributors
1: Questions about the Nature and Value of Reasoning
References
PART I: The Nature of Reasoning
Reasoning as a Mental Process
2: Inference without Reckoning
1. Inference without Self-awareness: Examples
2. How to Lack Self-awareness in Inferring Q from P
3. Unawareness in the Hands of the Reckoning Model
4. Reckoning De Dicto
5. What Kind of Response is Inferring?
5.1. Failures to respond: mental jogging and bypass
5.2. Responses to non-informational states: rhythm and rhyme, and association
5.3. Non-inferential responses: narrative and attention
5.4. Epistemic differences between poor inference and non-inference
6. Intelligence without Reckoning
References
3: A Linking Belief is Not Essential for Reasoning
1. Introduction
2. A First-order Linking Belief: The Taking Condition
3. What Reasoning Is
4. An Implicit Linking Belief
5. Intention Reasoning
6. An Implicit First-order Linking Belief?
7. An Implicit Second-order Linking Belief?
8. Conclusion
References
4: Attitudes in Active Reasoning
1. Introduction
2. Active Reasoning
3. Who Thinks What?
3.1. Active reasoning involves only outright beliefs
3.2. Active reasoning involves only graded beliefs
3.3. Active reasoning involves graded and outright beliefs
4. Two Non-starters
5. Four Features of Active Reasoning
5.1 Conscious awareness
5.2 Language involvement
5.3 Operating on contents
5.4 Working memory
6. Conclusion
References
Reasoning and Agency
5: The Question of Practical Reason
1. Is There a Question of Practical Reason?
2. The Theoretical Conception of Practical Reason
2.1. The descriptive interpretation
2.2. The normative interpretation
3. The Practical Conception
4. The Attitude-dependence Thesis
4.1. Non-normative beliefs
4.2. Normative beliefs
4.3. Intentions
4.4. Other attitudes?
5. The Upshot
5.1. Normative pluralism
5.2. The normativity of rationality
5.3. A novel form of constructivism
References
6: Is Reasoning a Form of Agency?
1. Is Reasoning Something the Reasoner Does?
2. Inferring p versus Taking p to Follow
3. Homologizing Inference
4. Knowing It When You See It, but Not Knowing What It Is
Reference
7: Inference, Agency, and Responsibility
1. Introduction
2. Beliefs and Occurrent Judgments
3. Epistemic Bases for Standing Beliefs
4. Epistemic Bases for Standing Beliefs: Then and Now
5. Proof and Memory
6. The Basis for Occurrent Judgments
7. Types of Inference
8. Inference versus Association
9. What is at Stake in this Debate?
10. Inference Requires Taking
11. Further Support for the Taking Condition: Responsibility and Control
12. Helmholtz and Sub-personal Inference
13. Non-reflective Reasoning in Humans
14. Richard’s Objections
15. Conclusion
References
PART II: The Value of Reasoning
Rules for Reasoning
8: Isolating Correct Reasoning
1. A Bit More on Correct Reasoning
2. Correct Reasoning and Justification
3. Correct Reasoning and Structural Rationality
4. Correct Reasoning as a Sui Generis Notion
References
9: Small Steps and Great Leaps in Thought: The Epistemology of Basic Deductive Rules
1. Introduction
2. Clarifications
3. Candidate Views
4. Conceptual Competence
4.1 Harmony
5. Developing the Account
6. Conclusion
References
10: With Power Comes Responsibility: Cognitive Capacities and Rational Requirements
1. Introduction
2. Four Cases
Case 1: Language understanding
Case 2: Face recognition
Case 3: Ultrasound
Case 4: Mind reading
3. Subject-relative Rational Requirements
4. Problems for the Cognitivist Strategy
5. Problems for the Perceptualist Strategy
6. Conclusion
References
Reasoning and Reasons
11: When Rational Reasoners Reason Differently
1. Denying Uniqueness
2. Against Permissivism
2.1. Consensus
2.2. Justificatory arbitrariness
2.3. Causal arbitrariness
2.4. Evidence and truth
3. The Reasoning Room
4. Conclusion
References
12: The Epistemic Innocence of Optimistically Biased Beliefs
1. Realism and Wellbeing
2. Epistemic Innocence
3. Optimistically Biased Beliefs
4. Psychological Benefits of Optimistically Biased Beliefs
5. The Epistemic Benefit Condition
6. The No Alternatives Condition
7. Conclusions and Implications
References
13: Sovereign Agency
1. Introduction
2. Assumptions
3. Deliberation as Authorization
4. A Closer Look at the Authorization of Intentions
5. Catching My Breath
6. Deliberation and Responsibility
7. Deliberation and Reason Compliance
8. Deliberation and Self-knowledge
9. Midpoint Summary
10. Intentions Function as Reasons
11. The Authority of Commands
12. Intentions Function as Commands
13. Functioning as Commands vs. ActuallyBeing Commands
14. Intentions Are Reasons
15. Evil Intentions
16. Defective Deliberation
17. Conclusion
Index