This essay argues that politically motivated business cycles could persist in a democratic society even if the electorate votes in a rational, fully informed manner, provided that government policymakers have the means to systematically generate macroeconomic fluctuations. This cyclic outcome reflec
Rational ignorance and voting behavior
✍ Scribed by César Martinelli
- Publisher
- Springer-Verlag
- Year
- 2006
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 280 KB
- Volume
- 35
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0020-7276
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
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