Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind
β Scribed by Fodor J.A.
- Book ID
- 105944357
- Publisher
- MIT Press
- Year
- 1987
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 10 MB
- Series
- Explorations in Cognitive Science
- Category
- Library
- ISBN-13
- 9780262560528
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
β¦ Synopsis
Cognitivism argues that psychology studies behavior to infer unobservable theoretical constructs, such as `belief,' that summarize and explain empirical observations and predict new phenomena. Here, Fodor tries to provide a scientific account of commonsense belief/desire psychology by defending a representational theory of mind. Assuming that there is no alternative to the vocabulary of commonsense psychological explanation, he proposes that we have an infinite set of mental symbols at our disposal and that a propositional attitude is equivalent to a symbol's occurring and its functioning in a particular causal role. Underlying his account is the view that mental processes will turn out to be physical processes. Highly recommended for philosophers of mind and cognitive psychologists.
π SIMILAR VOLUMES
Common to the idea, and the language, of man as "religious being" is the concept of his nature as "spirit", or "spiritual being." Among many ways the word "spirit" is used in discourse, there has been the way common to idealism, and to humanistic and religious philosophies in general. In humanistic