Property rights theory, transaction costs theory, and agency theory: an organizational economics approach to strategic management
β Scribed by Jongwook Kim; Joseph T. Mahoney
- Publisher
- John Wiley and Sons
- Year
- 2005
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 200 KB
- Volume
- 26
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0143-6570
- DOI
- 10.1002/mde.1218
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
β¦ Synopsis
Property rights theory has common antecedents with contractual theories of the firm such as transaction costs and agency theories, and is yet distinct from these theories. We illustrate fundamental theoretical principles derived from these three theories by analyzing the business case of oil field unitization. Theoretical principles and application of theory to oil field unitization are each summarized. From this, it is possible to see how property rights theory is well suited to explain business situations where inefficient economic outcomes persist. Additionally, property rights theory forges new theoretical connections with other branches of organizational economics, in particular, resource-based theory.
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