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Proper belief revision and rationalizability in dynamic games

✍ Scribed by Andrés Perea

Publisher: Springer-Verlag
Year: 2006
Tongue: English
Weight: 407 KB
Volume: 34
Category: Article
ISSN: 0020-7276
DOI: 10.1007/s00182-006-0031-8

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