Professor Scheffler on falsifiability and meaning

✍ Scribed by Arnold B. Levison

• Publisher: Springer Netherlands
• Year: 1965
• Tongue: English
• Weight: 245 KB
• Volume: 16
• Category: Article
• ISSN: 0031-8116
• DOI: 10.1007/bf00423087

✦ Synopsis

STUDIES

that have been brought against Russell's. Thus it has been argued that "G(~x) (Fx)" does not explicitly imply the existence or the uniqueness of what is F, and indeed on the new definition it does not. On Russell's theory it also follows from the description statement that all F's are G. Thus, to return to our example, if I have only one piece of pie to give, then the children can hold me for a liar on two counts. Not only was I wrong in predicting that there would be a unique winner, I am also reneging on my promise to give them each a piece of pie. Again, the proposed definition does not lead me into this difficulty. On the other hand, it does not go to the opposite extreme of declaring my original statement meaningless for this context. It would indeed be strange if a meaningless statement could incite the children to a race.