Product market objectives and the formation of research joint ventures

✍ Scribed by Patrick Greenlee; Bruno Cassiman

• Publisher: John Wiley and Sons
• Year: 1999
• Tongue: English
• Weight: 132 KB
• Volume: 20
• Category: Article
• ISSN: 0143-6570
• DOI: 10.1002/(sici)1099-1468(199905)20:3<115::aid-mde927>3.0.co;2-v

✦ Synopsis

In this paper we extend the existing literature on research and development (R&D) investments and research joint ventures (RJVs) in two important ways. First, we analyze and compare the case where firms collude in the product market to the benchmark case of competition in the output market. Second, we allow firms to form coalitions endogenously as a separate stage in the game. We develop profit functions that depend on the partition of firms into joint ventures and the nature of product competition between venture partners. Our results illustrate the restrictive nature of some assumptions made in the literature. Typically multiple RJVs of different sizes form in equilibrium. In general, RJVs should not be promoted if they entail product market collusion. Given the information available to policy-makers, it is unlikely that an R&D policy more refined than analyzing and allowing RJVs on a case-by-case basis is feasible.