Principal agent relationships and the efficiency of hospitals
✍ Scribed by Martijn Ludwig; Frits Van Merode; Wim Groot
- Publisher
- Springer
- Year
- 2009
- Tongue
- French
- Weight
- 368 KB
- Volume
- 11
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 1618-7598
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
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