Preference fusion when the number of alternatives exceeds two: indirect scoring procedures
✍ Scribed by Pavel Yu. Chebotarev; Elena Shamis
- Publisher
- Elsevier Science
- Year
- 1999
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 202 KB
- Volume
- 336
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0016-0032
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
✦ Synopsis
We consider the problem of aggregation of incomplete preferences represented by arbitrary binary relations or incomplete paired comparison matrices. For a number of indirect scoring procedures we examine whether or not they satisfy the axiom of self-consistent monotonicity. The class of win-loss combining scoring procedures is introduced which contains a majority of known scoring procedures. Two main results are established. According to the first one, every win-loss combining scoring procedure breaks self-consistent monotonicity. The second result provides a sufficient condition of satisfying self-consistent monotonicity. 1998 The Franklin Institute. Published by Elsevier Science Ltd.