Preference And Information (Ashgate New Critical Thinking in Philosophy

✍ Scribed by Dan Egonsson

• Publisher: Lund Humphries Pub Ltd
• Year: 2007
• Tongue: English
• Leaves: 176
• Category: Library

✦ Synopsis

Is it important for quality of life that the preferences we satisfy are rational and well-informed? Standard preferentialist theories allege that a person's preferences and their satisfaction are the correct measure of well-being. In preference-sensitive theories preferences are important but do not count for everything. This raises the question of whether we ought to make demands on these preferences. In this book, Egonsson presents a critical analysis of the 'full-information account of the good', which claims that only the satisfaction of rational and fully informed preferences has value for a person. The problems he deals with include: How is an information requirement to be formulated and shaped? Is it possible to design a requirement that is neutral to the agent's epistemic situation? Is the requirement reasonable? Does it make sense to claim that a person is better off if we satisfy the preferences she would have had in some merely hypothetical circumstances? This is an important new book on preference rationality which will be of great interest to academics and students of ethics, quality of life and rationality.

✦ Table of Contents

Contents......Page 8
Preface......Page 12
Introduction......Page 14
1.1 Sumner’s Example......Page 20
1.2 Disappointment and the Vigorousness of a Preference......Page 21
1.3 The Need for an Information Requirement......Page 22
1.4 Two Understandings of ‘Object’......Page 25
1.5 Fumerton’s Distinction......Page 26
1.6 Fumerton’s Distinction and the Information Requirement......Page 29
2.1 Disappointment in the Intentional Understanding......Page 32
2.2 Preference and Satisfaction Rationality......Page 33
2.3 The Wittgenstein Case......Page 34
2.4 Recapitulation......Page 37
2.5 Buying a Pig in a Poke......Page 38
3.1 ‘The Desire Satisfaction Theory’......Page 40
3.2 Feelings and Reactions to Feelings......Page 42
3.3 Knowing and Having an Experience......Page 44
3.5 The Time Aspect......Page 46
3.6 Two Situations......Page 48
3.7 Versions of the Information Requirement......Page 51
3.8 A Problem of Possible Alternatives......Page 52
3.9 A Comment on Metaphorical Language......Page 55
4 The Qualitative Element Criticized......Page 56
4.1 Maximization......Page 57
4.2 The Hypnotist and Drug Examples......Page 61
4.3 Gibbard’s First Example......Page 62
4.4 Gibbard’s Second Example......Page 64
4.5 Savulescu on Obstructive Desires......Page 65
5.1 Producing a Neurosis......Page 68
5.2 Thanking Yourself Afterwards......Page 70
5.3 A Standing Desire for Future Satisfaction......Page 71
5.4 The Importance of the Future......Page 72
5.5 Ought Future Wants to be Discounted?......Page 75
5.6 Conclusion and Coda......Page 77
6.1 The Truth Element and Epistemic Circumstances......Page 84
6.2 The Availability Qualification......Page 86
6.3 Two Models......Page 87
6.4 Deliberative Correctness......Page 88
6.5 Conclusion......Page 89
7.1 Korsgaard’s Distinctions......Page 92
7.2 Combinations......Page 94
7.3 Applications of the Dependency Idea......Page 95
7.4 Moore on Intrinsicality......Page 98
7.5 Strong and Weak Dependency......Page 99
7.6 Negative Conditionals......Page 102
7.7 Moore’s ‘Value as a Whole’......Page 103
7.8 Another Objection......Page 105
7.9 The Model of Instrumental Preference Rationality......Page 106
7.10 Returning to the Discussion of Preference Objects......Page 107
7.11 Objects and Non-Instrumental Preferences......Page 109
7.12 Concluding Remarks......Page 110
8.1 Consistency......Page 112
8.2 An Example......Page 117
8.3 Brandt’s Conception of Irrational Intrinsic Preferences......Page 118
8.4 Kusser’s Argument against Brandt......Page 122
8.5 Conclusion......Page 123
9.1 Traditional Formulations......Page 124
9.2 The Punk Rock Example......Page 126
9.3 Railton’s Objectified Subjective Interests......Page 129
9.4 The First Argument......Page 130
9.5 The Second Argument......Page 133
9.6 Rosati’s ‘Two-Tier Internalism’......Page 135
9.7 Conclusion......Page 137
10.1 Life-Sustaining Treatment......Page 140
10.2 The Conscious-T Case......Page 142
10.3 Consent......Page 143
10.4 Psychiatric Care......Page 149
10.5 Assessing the ‘Best Interest Model’......Page 153
10.6 Assessing the ‘Incompetency Model’......Page 154
10.8 Conclusion......Page 157
11.1 Summary......Page 160
11.2 Conclusions......Page 165
Bibliography......Page 170
G......Page 174
P......Page 175
W......Page 176