## III The first two papers in this final part of the symposium continue in the spirit of the preceding papers, in each of which a specific problem at the interface between philosophy and modern physics was analyzed. The problem considered in Urani and Gale's paper is a minimal extension of the Sp
Preface to part III
โ Scribed by J. H. F.
- Publisher
- Springer Netherlands
- Year
- 1990
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 54 KB
- Volume
- 83
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0039-7857
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
โฆ Synopsis
Part HI begins with a critical exploration of Fodor's Language of Thought hypothesis, in which Braddon-Mitchell and Fitzpatrick contend that, when correct views about the nature of psychological explanation are considered, the theoretical necessity for a language of thought tends to disappear. As they emphasize, their position does not imply that Fodor's hypothesis cannot be true, but rather that a prima facie case on its behalf has not yet been made. Zemach differentiates between "internalist" accounts of understanding (that are to be found in the work of Fodor, Dennett, and other functionalists) and "externalist" accounts (that are associated with the work of Davidson, Burge, and other semantical theorists) in defense of a Wittgensteinian conception of mentalistic semantics, which he applies to meanings, sentences, and beliefs. In the first of her papers, Vaina investigates the modular character of visual functions in the human visual cortex. She reviews the computational theory of early visual functions and extends this approach to higher-level capacities, adducing neurological evidence of the existence of two systems in the human species, one for spatial vision and one for object vision. In the second of her papers, Vaina provides an extended case study of a patient suffering from a brain lesion, whose linguistic and general cognitive abilities were unimpaired but whose visual capabilities suffered from specific kinds of limitations that shed light on the relationship between brain structure and mental functions. Hintikka elaborates certain philosophical consequences that attend findings of this kind, suggesting that there is a close connection between his "perspectival vs. public" distinction and Vaina's "where vs. what" distinction, whereby an otherwise abstract analysis gains empirical support. And Weintraub's survey of decision-theoretic epistemology, in which she maintains that epistemic theories based on cognitive utilities confront a dilemma that cannot be readily overcome, brings this special symposium to a stimulating conclusion. J. H. F.
๐ SIMILAR VOLUMES
This special symposium devoted to epistemology and cognition reflects the rich and fertile state of current research upon problems within this domain. Ramsey and Stich provide an excellent illustration with their searching analysis of the relations between connectionism and forms of nativism. Ramse