Practical Intelligence and the Virtues

✍ Scribed by Daniel C. Russell

• Year: 2009
• Tongue: English
• Leaves: 458
• Category: Library

✦ Synopsis

One of the most important developments in modern moral philosophy is the resurgence of interest in the virtues. In this new book, Daniel Russell explores two important hopes for such an approach to moral thought: that starting from the virtues should cast light on what makes an action right, and that notions like character, virtue, and vice should yield a plausible picture of human psychology. Russell argues that the key to each of these hopes is an understanding of the cognitive and deliberative skills involved in the virtues. If right action is defined in terms of acting generously or kindly, then these virtues must involve skills for determining what the kind or generous thing to do would be on a given occasion. Likewise, Russell argues that understanding virtuous action as the intelligent pursuit of virtuous goals yields a promising picture of the psychology of virtue. This book develops an Aristotelian account of the virtue of practical intelligence or "phronesis"--an excellence of deliberating and making choices--which Russell argues is a necessary part of every virtue. This emphasis on the roots of the virtues in the practical intellect contrasts with ambivalence about the practical intellect in much recent work on the virtues--a trend Russell argues is ultimately perilous for virtue theory. This book also takes a penetrating look at issues like the unity of the virtues, responsibility for character, and that elusive figure, 'the virtuous person'. Written in a clear and careful manner, Practical Intelligence and the Virtues will appeal to philosophers and students alike in moral philosophy and moral psychology.

✦ Table of Contents

Contents......Page 16
1. Practical Intelligence and the Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach......Page 20
1.1 Deliberation......Page 23
1.2 Phronesis......Page 32
1.3 The Phronesis Controversy......Page 50
Part I. Phronesis, Virtue, and Right Action......Page 54
2. Right Action for Virtue Ethics......Page 56
2.1 Right Action and Serious Practical Concerns......Page 58
2.2 Two Constraints on Right Action......Page 63
2.3 Must Virtue Ethics Accept the Act Constraint?......Page 65
2.4 Can Virtue Ethics Accept the Act Constraint?......Page 84
3. Right Action and Virtuous Motives......Page 91
3.1 The Structure of Agent-Based Virtue Ethics......Page 93
3.2 Virtuous Acts and Virtuous Motivations......Page 96
3.3 Why Virtues are Virtues......Page 105
3.4 Reasons for Virtue......Page 114
4. Right Action and ‘The Virtuous Person’......Page 122
4.1 Doing Without ‘The Virtuous Person’......Page 123
4.2 ‘Virtuous Enough’......Page 131
4.3 Ideals and Aspirations......Page 142
4.4 Virtues, Persons, and ‘The Virtuous Person’......Page 149
4.5 Representing ‘The Virtuous Person’......Page 154
Part II. The Enumeration Problem......Page 162
5.1 The Enumeration Problem: An Introduction......Page 164
5.2 Enumeration and Overall Virtuous Actions......Page 180
5.3 Enumeration and Overall Virtuous Persons......Page 185
5.4 Enumeration and Naturalism......Page 191
6. Individuating the Virtues......Page 196
6.1 From Individuation to Enumeration......Page 197
6.2 ‘The Same Reasons’......Page 207
6.3 Reasons, Individuation, and Cardinality......Page 215
6.4 Implications for Hard Virtue Ethics......Page 223
7. Magnificence, Generosity, and Subordination......Page 228
7.1 Magnificence as a Virtue......Page 231
7.2 Subordination, Specialization, and Cardinality......Page 236
7.3 Alternatives to the Subordination View......Page 240
Part III. Situations, Dispositions, and Virtues......Page 256
8. Situations and Broad-Based Dispositions......Page 258
8.1 Situationism and Dispositionism......Page 262
8.2 Situationism and Personality......Page 271
8.3 Idiographic Predictions of Consistency......Page 282
9. Situations and Dispositions: Examining the Evidence......Page 287
9.1 How to Test Broad-Based Dispositions for Cross-Situational Consistency......Page 288
9.2 Putting Dispositions to the Test: Four Representative Experiments......Page 292
9.3 Interpreting the Findings......Page 297
10. From Situationism to Virtue Theory......Page 311
10.1 Situationism: From Empirical to Philosophical Psychology......Page 314
10.2 Situationism and Virtue Theory: Normative Adequacy......Page 323
10.3 From Common Sense to Virtue Theory?......Page 325
10.4 Out-Sourcing the Empirical Work?......Page 333
10.5 A Cognitive-Affective Approach to the Virtues......Page 342
Part IV. Defending Hard Virtue Theory......Page 352
11. Phronesis and the Unity of the Virtues......Page 354
11.1 The Unity of Which Virtues?......Page 358
11.2 What Unifies the Virtues?......Page 374
11.3 Attributive and Model Theses......Page 381
12.1 Depth, Self-Construction, and Responsibility......Page 393
12.2 On Responsibility and ‘Ultimate Responsibility’ for Character......Page 399
12.3 What is Critical Distance?......Page 407
12.4 From Critical Distance to Responsibility......Page 411
12.5 Objections to the Critical Distance View......Page 423
Works Cited......Page 434
Index Locorum......Page 448
C......Page 452
F......Page 453
K......Page 454
P......Page 455
S......Page 456
V......Page 457
Z......Page 458