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Population equilibrium with support in evolutionary matrix games

✍ Scribed by Tadeusz Ostrowski

Publisher: Elsevier Science
Year: 2006
Tongue: English
Weight: 109 KB
Volume: 417
Category: Article
ISSN: 0024-3795
DOI: 10.1016/j.laa.2006.03.039

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