Politico-economic cycles of regulation and deregulation

✍ Scribed by Gustav Feichtinger; Franz Wirl

• Book ID: 116111245
• Publisher: Elsevier Science
• Year: 1991
• Tongue: English
• Weight: 949 KB
• Volume: 7
• Category: Article
• ISSN: 0176-2680
• DOI: 10.1016/0176-2680(91)90032-x

✦ Synopsis

This paper considers politico-economic cycles that do not depend on the exogenous electoral cycles. More precisely, the paper develops a positive model of intertemporal subsidy strategies for an authoritarian and dynastic government.

It will be shown -applying the Hopf bifurcation theorem -that cyclical strategies, i.e. waves of regulation, populism alternating with deregulation, cuts in social programmes, etc., may be optimal.

*We presented a preliminary version of the paper at operations Research 1990 and acknowledge the helpful suggestions from the participants, in particular, the elaborate comments from Professor William A. Brock and Franz X. Hop. We are further grateful for the able research assistance of Andreas Novak and for the suggestions from one of the editors.

'E.g. in monarchies, see Usher (1989), in democracies with dominant parties like in Japan (The Liberals) and in Mexico (The Revolutionary Party) or underlying the electoral cycles in two party democracies.