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Politicians and Poachers: The Political Economy of Wildlife Policy in Africa (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions)

โœ Scribed by Clark C. Gibson


Year
1999
Tongue
English
Leaves
260
Category
Library

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โœฆ Synopsis


This book explores the politics of wildlife conservation policy in Africa, specifically Zambia, Kenya, and Zimbabwe. The book addresses a general question: Why don't wildlife policies seem to be working? Rather than use standard explanations such as "bureaucratic inefficiency" or "corrupt dictators," the book demonstrates how politicians at all levels use wildlife policy for their own political ends, which may or may not include conservation. The book uses electoral and archival data, as well as interviews with individuals ranging from presidents to poachers to address this issue.


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