Political Institutions and Conservation Outcomes: Wildlife Policy in Zambia

✍ Scribed by Clark C. Gibson

• Publisher: Swiss Political Science Association
• Year: 2000
• Tongue: German
• Weight: 349 KB
• Volume: 6
• Category: Article
• ISSN: 1420-3529
• DOI: 10.1002/j.1662-6370.2000.tb00287.x

✦ Synopsis

Abstract

“Messy” democratic political institutions might generate ineffective conservation policy watered down by competing interest groups and rival political parties. A hardcore environmentalist may believe that a pro‐conservation dictatorship would be the type government best able to meet her goals. Such an environmental fantasy became reality in Zambia under President (1972‐1991) Kenneth Kaunda. But despite his dictatorial powers, he did not have much success in curbing the poaching epidemic that swept through Zambia in the 1970s and 80s. The structure of the one‐party state, together with a fall in the price of Zambia's principal export (copper) and a concomitant increase in the value of many wildlife products, created an environment that generated incentives for politicians, bureaucrats, and citizens to disregard Kaunda. This analysis challenges conventional wisdom about the politics of one‐party states. It shows that even in the case of one‐party government, the structure of political institutions remains critical to the extent of a dictator's control.