Political Competition: Theory and Applications

✍ Scribed by John E. Roemer

• Publisher: Harvard University Press
• Year: 2006
• Tongue: English
• Leaves: 349
• Category: Library

✦ Table of Contents

Title Page - Political Competition......Page 1
Copyright......Page 4
Contents......Page 7
Preface......Page 11
Introduction......Page 14
Figure I.1 The plan of the book......Page 18
1.1 Citizens, Voters, and Parties......Page 27
1.2 The DownsModel......Page 30
Figure 1.1 A non-quasi-concave function with a unique local maximum......Page 33
Figure 1.2 All citizens with ideal policies.........Page 36
Figure 1.3 The set of types in Example 1.2 with ideal tax rate less than t......Page 38
1.3 TheWittmanModel......Page 42
Figure 1.4......Page 47
1.4 Conclusion......Page 50
2.1 Introduction......Page 52
2.2 The State-Space Approach to Uncertainty......Page 53
2.3 An Error-DistributionModel of Uncertainty......Page 59
2.4 A Finite-TypeModel......Page 61
Figure 2.1......Page 63
Figure 2.2......Page 64
2.5 Conclusion......Page 65
3.2 The DownsModel......Page 66
3.3 The Wittman Model: An Example......Page 69
Figure 3.1a Conditional payoff functions at equilibrium for Example 3.1......Page 72
Figure 3.1b Conditional payoff functions at equilibrium for Example 3.1,......Page 73
3.4 Existence ofWittman Equilibrium......Page 75
3.5 Properties ofWittman Equilibrium......Page 83
3.6 Summary......Page 85
Figure 3.2......Page 86
4.1 Simple Models of Redistribution: The Politics of Extremism......Page 87
4.2 Politico-Economic Equilibrium with Labor-Supply Elasticity......Page 90
Table 4.1 Wittman equilibria in model of section 4.2......Page 94
4.3 Partisan Dogmatism and Political Extremism......Page 95
4.4 A DynamicModel of Political Cycles......Page 96
Table 4.2 Wittman equilibria in Hirschman model......Page 100
Figure 4.1 Long-term electoral cycles in the Hirschman model......Page 102
4.5 Conclusion......Page 103
5.1 Introduction......Page 104
5.2 Average-Member Nash Equilibrium......Page 105
5.3 Condorcet-Nash Equilibrium......Page 108
5.4 Conclusion......Page 115
6.2 The DownsModel......Page 117
Figure 6.1 The domain of policies in Example 6.3......Page 126
6.3 TheWittmanModel......Page 130
Figure 6.2 Example 6.4......Page 132
Figure 6.3......Page 134
Figure 6.5......Page 135
6.4 Conclusion......Page 136
7.2 The State-Space and Error-DistributionModels of Uncertainty......Page 138
7.3 The Coughlin Model......Page 141
7.4 The Lindbeck-Weibull Model......Page 144
7.5 Adapting the Coughlin Model to the Case of Aggregate Uncertainty......Page 148
Figure 7.2......Page 151
7.6 Conclusion......Page 158
8.1 Introduction......Page 159
8.2 Party Factions......Page 162
8.3 PUNE as a Bargaining Equilibrium......Page 169
Figure 8.1 The proof of Theorem 8.2......Page 172
8.4 A Differential Characterization of PUNE......Page 173
Figure 8.2 Party 1’s policy at local PUNE......Page 175
8.5 RegularWittman Equilibrium......Page 177
8.6 PUNEs in the UnidimensionalModel......Page 180
8.7 PUNEs in aMultidimensional EuclideanModel......Page 181
Figure 8.4......Page 182
8.8 Conclusion......Page 184
9.1 Introduction......Page 186
9.2 TheModel......Page 187
Figure 9.1......Page 189
Figure 9.2......Page 190
9.3 The Equilibrium Concepts......Page 192
9.4 Analysis of Party Competition......Page 193
Figure 9.3......Page 194
Figure 9.4......Page 195
Figure 9.5......Page 197
9.5 Calibration......Page 200
9.6 Conclusion......Page 201
10.1 The Historical Issue and aModel Preview......Page 203
10.2 The Politico-Economic Environment......Page 206
10.3 Analysis of PUNEs......Page 209
10.4 Empirical Tests......Page 212
Table 10.1 Black issue......Page 213
Table 10.2 Salience of values issue, U.S. electorate......Page 214
Table 10.3 British social attitudes survey, 1993: Authoritarian versus libertarian preferences......Page 215
10.5 Proofs of Theorems......Page 216
10.6 Concluding Remark......Page 221
11.1 Introduction......Page 223
11.2 The LuebbertModel......Page 226
11.3 Testing Luebbert’s Theory......Page 232
Table 11.1 Sweden, 1930......Page 234
Table 11.2 Sweden, 1930......Page 235
Table 11.3 Germany, 1930......Page 236
Table 11.4 Germany, 1933......Page 237
Figure 11.1b Projections of 281 PUNEs, Right policies, for Sweden......Page 238
Figure 11.1c Swedish PUNEs of Figures 11.1a and b, shown on the budget simplex......Page 239
Table 11.5 Sweden, 1930......Page 242
Table 11.6 Germany, 1933......Page 243
11.4 Introducing the Communists: A Three-PartyModel......Page 244
Table 11.8 The three-party PUNE policies......Page 252
Figure 11.2a Communist policies in the three-party model......Page 253
Figure 11.2cRight policies in the threeparty model......Page 254
11.5 Conclusion......Page 255
11.6 Methodological Coda......Page 256
I. The Derivation of Formulae (11.12) and (11.13)......Page 258
12.1 Introduction......Page 265
12.2 The Model......Page 267
12.3 Characterization of PUNEs......Page 268
Table 12.2......Page 270
12.5 Conclusion......Page 271
13.1 Introduction......Page 273
13.2 Endogenous Parties......Page 274
13.3 Taxation and Race......Page 275
13.4 Fitting theModel to U.S. Data......Page 277
Table 13.1 Bivariate lognormal parameters......Page 279
Table 13.2 Endogenous party PUNEs in the tax-race model of section 13.3......Page 281
13.5 Quadratic Taxation......Page 283
Figure 13.2......Page 284
Figure 13.3......Page 287
Figure 13.4 Tax policies for Left and Right, at the average endogenousparty equilibrium......Page 288
Figure 13.5b Marginal rate of taxation as a function of income, Right policy......Page 289
13.6 Private Financing of Parties......Page 290
13.7 A Technical Remark on the Existence of PUNEs......Page 291
13.9 Why the Poor Do Not Expropriate the Rich: Reprise......Page 293
14.1 Introduction......Page 295
14.2 The Payoff Function of a Wittman Party......Page 296
14.3 An Example of Coalition Government: Unidimensional Wittman Equilibrium......Page 304
Table 14.1 Three-party equilibria, coalition governments......Page 307
Table 14.2 Three-party equilibria, coalition and majority governments......Page 309
14.4 Multidimensional Three-Party Politics......Page 310
14.5 Coalition Government with a Multidimensional Issue Space: An Example......Page 313
14.6 Conclusion......Page 318
A.1 Basics of Probability Theory......Page 323
Figure A.1 The Lebesgue integral......Page 327
Figure A.2 The density of a beta measure......Page 330
A.2 Some Concepts from Analysis 2......Page 332
Figure A.3 Farkas’ lemma......Page 334
References......Page 337
Index......Page 341