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Police Interrogations and Confessions in Massachusetts

✍ Scribed by Peter W. Agnes, Jr.


Publisher
Massachusetts Continuing Legal Education, Inc. (MCLE)
Year
2012
Tongue
English
Leaves
665
Edition
2012
Category
Library

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✦ Table of Contents


Preliminary Pages
PREFACE
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction
§ I.1 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DEBATE OVER THE SCOPE OF THE MIRANDA DOCTRINE
§ I.2 THE GROWING DIVERGENCE BETWEEN FEDERAL AND STATE LAW
§ I.2.1 Moran v. Burbine (Supreme Court)
§ I.2.2 Commonwealth v. Mavredakis (SJC)
§ I.3 FALSE CONFESSIONS
§ I.4 THE EDUCATIONAL NEEDS OF POLICE OFFICERS, LAWYERS, AND JUDGES
§ I.4.1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (Excerpts)
(a) Opinion for the Majority (Warren, C.J.)
(b) Separate Opinion by Justice Clarke (Concurring in Part, Dissenting in Part)
(c) Separate Opinion by Justice Harlan (Dissenting)
(d) Separate Opinion by Justice White (Dissenting)
NOTES
Chapter 1
The Rights of a Person Who Is Arrested
§ 1.1 THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
§ 1.2 OVERVIEW OF THE MIRANDA DOCTRINE
§ 1.2.1 The Basic Framework
(a) Duty to Administer Miranda Warnings
(b) The Administration of the Warnings Versus the Waiver of the Rights
(c) Right to Remain Silent
(d) Right to Counsel
§ 1.2.2 The Evolving Nature of Massachusetts Law
§ 1.3 NOTICE OF CRIME CHARGED
§ 1.4 RIGHT TO COUNSEL
§ 1.5 ADMISSION TO BAIL
§ 1.5.1 The Purpose of Bail
§ 1.5.2 Constitutional Rights
§ 1.5.3 Standards for Admission to Bail
§ 1.5.4 In-Court Bail Hearing
§ 1.5.5 Conditions of Release
§ 1.5.6 Out-of-Court (“After Hours”) Bail
(a) The Persons Authorized to Set Bail or to Release Defendants on Personal Recognizance
(b) Fees
(c) The Procedure Governing Out-of-Court Bail
§ 1.5.7 Preventative Detention
§ 1.5.8 Incompetent Defendant or Juvenile
(a) Regular Bail Hearing
(b) Dangerousness Hearings
§ 1.6 RIGHTS OF FOREIGN NATIONALS UNDER THE VIENNA CONVENTION
§ 1.7 THE BOOKING PROCESS
§ 1.7.1 General Rule
§ 1.7.2 Juveniles
§ 1.8 THE RIGHT TO PROMPT PRESENTMENT TO THE COURT
§ 1.8.1 General Rule
§ 1.8.2 “Safe Harbor” Rule
§ 1.8.3 What Triggers the “Safe Harbor” Rule
§ 1.8.4 Tolling the Running of the “Safe Harbor” Rule
§ 1.8.5 Waiver of the “Safe Harbor” Rule
§ 1.9 THE RIGHT TO USE THE TELEPHONE
§ 1.10 THE RIGHT TO AN INDEPENDENT MEDICAL EXAMINATION
NOTES
Chapter 2
The Miranda Doctrine
§ 2.1 INTRODUCTION TO THE MIRANDA DOCTRINE
§ 2.1.1 The Miranda Doctrine in a Nutshell
§ 2.1.2 The Historical, Constitutional, and Political Debate over the Validity of the Miranda Doctrine
§ 2.1.3 The Origin of Miranda
§ 2.1.4 The Holding in Miranda
§ 2.1.5 There Is an Alternative Procedure that Satisfies the Miranda Doctrine
§ 2.1.6 The Waiver of Rights Is the Linchpin of the Miranda Doctrine
§ 2.1.7 The Miranda Doctrine Is Triggered by Custodial Interrogation
§ 2.1.8 Definition of “Custodial Interrogation”
§ 2.1.9 Testimony Given in a Judicial Proceeding Is Not Custodial
§ 2.1.10 Questioning a Subject Who Is the Focus of the Investigation Is Not Necessarily Custodial Interrogation
§ 2.1.11 Miranda Warnings Are Not Required Simply Because a Person Is Arrested
§ 2.1.12 A Noncustodial Interrogation May Evolve into a Custodial Interrogation
§ 2.1.13 Questioning at Police Station not Always Custodial
§ 2.1.14 Defendant Must Waive Miranda Rights Before Custodial Interrogation
§ 2.1.15 Special Rules for Juveniles
§ 2.1.16 Cases Involving Evidence of Alcohol or Drug Use Must Be Closely Scrutinized
§ 2.1.17 Police Should Never Discourage Consultation with Counsel
§ 2.1.18 Miranda Doctrine Is Not Applicable to Questioning by Non-Law Enforcement Personnel
§ 2.1.19 Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel Does Not Attach at the Investigative Stage
§ 2.2 THE MEANING OF “CUSTODY” FOR PURPOSES OF MIRANDA
§ 2.2.1 Definition
§ 2.2.2 Burden of Proof
§ 2.2.3 Custody Is Determined by an Objective Test
§ 2.2.4 Custody Includes Formal Arrest
§ 2.2.5 Preliminary Questioning During Street Encounters, Motor Vehicle Stops, and the Execution of Search Warrants
§ 2.2.6 Custody Does Not Turn on Whether the Defendant Is the Focus of the Police Investigation
§ 2.2.7 Mere Existence of Probable Cause Does Not Mean the Person Is in Custody
§ 2.2.8 Mere Existence of a Warrant or Complaint Does Not Mean the Subject Is in Custody
§ 2.2.9 Custody Does Not Depend on the Subjective View of the Police
§ 2.2.10 Custody Is Not Limited to the Environment of the Police Station
§ 2.2.11 Miranda Warnings May Be Given as a Precaution
§ 2.2.12 An Incriminating Response Does Not Establish that the Setting Is Custodial
§ 2.2.13 Questioning at the Police Station
(a) Police Station Questioning that Is Custodial
(b) Police Station Questioning that Is Not Custodial
(c) Analytical Framework for Determining the Custody Question in the Setting of a Police Station
§ 2.2.14 Questioning a Person at Locations Other than the Police Station
(a) Home
(b) Hospital
When Defendant Is the Person Being Treated
When Defendant Is Not the Person Being Treated
(c) Interviews of Persons Confined in Correctional Institutions
Neither Pretrial nor Postconviction Confinement Is Per se Custodial for Purposes of the Miranda Doctrine
The “Totality of the Circumstances” Test
(d) School
(e) Courthouse
(f) Lawyer’s Office
(g) Police Cruiser
(h) Public Place
§ 2.3 THE MEANING OF “INTERROGATION” FOR MIRANDA PURPOSES
§ 2.3.1 Definition—Express Questioning or Its Functional Equivalent
§ 2.3.2 Determination of Interrogation Is Based on an Objective Test
§ 2.3.3 Spontaneous and Volunteered Statements
§ 2.3.4 Police Questions and Statements that Are Not Interrogation
(a) Questions or Statements Required to Be Asked or Made by State Law
(b) Conversation About Matters Unrelated to Crime
(c) Clarifying Remarks by the Police
(d) Questions Designed to Test Defendant’s Competency
(e) Recording Information Relating to Defendant’s Telephone Calls
§ 2.3.5 False Statements, Trickery, and Psychological Ploys May Constitute Interrogation
§ 2.3.6 Remarks Overheard by the Police
§ 2.3.7 Questioning by the Police Motivated by Humanitarian Concerns
§ 2.3.8 Statements Made While in Protective Custody
§ 2.3.9 Public Safety Exception to Miranda
§ 2.3.10 Police Booking Exception to Miranda
§ 2.3.11 Questions Asked by Persons Other than Police or Their Agents
(a) Applicability of the Miranda Doctrine
(b) Voluntariness Doctrine
§ 2.3.12 Court Ordered Psychological Examinations
(a) Court-Ordered Mental Health Examinations and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
Criminal Responsibility
Competency Examination
(b) Warnings Required by Commonwealth v. Lamb
§ 2.4 FORM OF THE MIRANDA WARNINGS
§ 2.4.1 Introduction
§ 2.4.2 Oral Versus Written Administration of Warnings
§ 2.4.3 Better Practice to Use So-Called “Fifth Warning” (Right to Stop Questioning)
§ 2.4.4 Better Practice to Inform Defendant of Right to have Counsel Present at all Stages
§ 2.4.5 The Better Practice Is to Use the “Waiver” Question
§ 2.4.6 Warnings used for Non-English Speaking Defendant
§ 2.5 WAIVER OF MIRANDA RIGHTS
§ 2.5.1 Introduction
(a) Federal Law
(b) Massachusetts Law
§ 2.5.2 The Framework of the Waive Doctrine
§ 2.5.3 There Is a Presumption Against Waiver
§ 2.5.4 Waiver Is a Question of Law
§ 2.5.5 A Valid Waiver May Be Express or Implied
§ 2.5.6 Differences Between Implied Waiver Under Federal and Massachusetts Law
§ 2.5.7 A Valid Waiver Does Not Require a Showing that the Defendant Appreciated the Consequences of Speaking or Remaining Silent
§ 2.5.8 Waiver of Miranda Is Not Offense-Specific
§ 2.5.9 Commonwealth’s Burden of Proof
§ 2.5.10 A Defendant’s Waiver May Be Selective or Partial
§ 2.5.11 Duration of Waiver of Miranda Rights
§ 2.5.12 Under Massachusetts Law, Miranda Waiver Does Not Operate Retroactively (Doctrine of “Presumptive Taint”)
§ 2.5.13 Defendant’s Right to Be Notified of Availability of Counsel
(a) Police Obligation when Counsel Seeks to Contact Custodial Client
(b) The Defendant Remains Responsible for the Decision Whether to Speak with the Police or to Assert His Miranda Rights
§ 2.5.14 Inaccurate or Incomplete Miranda Warnings
§ 2.6 SHOULD THE MIRANDA WARNINGS BE SIMPLIFIED?
§ 2.6.1 Comprehensibility Problems—An Overview
§ 2.6.2 The American Bar Association Recommendation
§ 2.6.3 Special Juvenile Warnings in New Hampshire
§ 2.6.4 Miranda Warnings in Use in Massachusetts
§ 2.7 WAIVER OF MIRANDA RIGHTS BY JUVENILES
§ 2.7.1 Introduction
§ 2.7.2 Massachusetts Follows the “Interested Adult” Rule
§ 2.7.3 The Juvenile Must Be Given an “Actual Opportunity” to Consult with the “Interested Adult”
§ 2.7.4 Application of the “Interested Adult” Rule
(a) The “Interested Adult” Must Have the Independence and the Capacity to Assist the Juvenile
(b) Language Barriers
(c) The Requirement of an Actual Opportunity for Consultation
§ 2.7.5 Failure to Comply with “Interested Adult” Rule
§ 2.7.6 Massachusetts Does Not Require Use of Any Special Form of Miranda Warnings for Juveniles
§ 2.7.7 Additional Advice to Juveniles
§ 2.8 RESPONSIBILITY OF THE MOTION JUDGE OR TRIAL JUDGE
§ 2.9 FACTORS AFFECTING WHETHER THERE IS A VALID WAIVER OF MIRANDA OR WHETHER A STATEMENT IS VOLUNTARY
§ 2.9.1 Alcohol or Drug Use
§ 2.9.2 Mental Illness
§ 2.9.3 Mentally Challenged Subjects
§ 2.9.4 Physical Abuse or Threats
§ 2.9.5 Other Medical, Emotional, or Physical Impairments
§ 2.9.6 Language Barriers
§ 2.9.7 Deception and Misrepresentation
§ 2.9.8 Age
(a) Special Rule Governs Miranda Waivers by Juvenile
(b) Age as a Factor in Determining Validity of a Waiver
§ 2.9.9 Limited Education
§ 2.9.10 Promises of Leniency
§ 2.9.11 Encouraging the Defendant to Tell the Truth
§ 2.9.12 Defendant’s Prior Experience with Law Enforcement
§ 2.10 EXPERT WITNESS TESTIMONY ON WAIVER OF MIRANDA RIGHTS AND/OR VOLUNTARINESS
§ 2.10.1 Foundation Requirements
§ 2.10.2 Assessing the Credibility of Expert Witnesses
§ 2.10.3 Permissible Scope of Expert Witness Testimony
(a) Credibility of Witnesses
(b) Interrogation Practices
(c) Defendant’s Intoxication or Impaired Cognitive Functioning
§ 2.11 THE DEFENDANT’S SILENCE, ASSERTION OF RIGHTS, OR DENIAL OF GUILT IS GENERALLY NOT ADMISSIBLE AT TRIAL (DOYLE V. OHIO ISSUES)
§ 2.11.1 The Defendant’s Silence, Inquiry About His or Her Rights, or Assertion of His or Her Rights Following Arrest Is Not Admissible at Trial
§ 2.11.2 The Doyle Doctrine Does Not Affect Admissibility of Defendant’s Volunteered Statements Following Arrest or Receipt of Miranda Warnings
§ 2.11.3 The Defendant‘s Prearrest, Pre-Miranda Silence Is Generally Not Admissible Under Massachusetts Law
§ 2.11.4 The Defendant’s Assertion of the Right to Remain Silent, or a Request for Counsel Prior to Arrest, but in the Course of Police Interrogation, Is Not Admissible at Trial Under Massachusetts Law
§ 2.11.5 The Defendant’s Post-Miranda Denial of Guilt, Like His Silence, Is Not Admissible Under Massachusetts Law
§ 2.11.6 Evidence of Differences Between the Defendant’s Voluntary Prearrest or Postarrest Statements Obtained in Compliance with Miranda Is Admissible to Contradict the Defendant’s Testimony at Trial
§ 2.11.7 Limited Admissibility of Postarrest Silence or Assertion of Rights
§ 2.12 ASSERTING MIRANDA RIGHTS
§ 2.12.1 Defendant Must Be in Police Custody
§ 2.12.2 The Right to Remain Silent
(a) The Right Belongs to the Defendant
(b) Timing and Form
(c) Exercising the Right to Remain Silent Prior to a Valid Waiver of Miranda Rights
(d) In the Postwaiver Setting, a Heightened Standard of Clarity Is Used to Determine Whether the Defendant Invoked the Right to Remain Silent
(e) Uncertainty About Whether the Right to Remain Silent Has Been Exercised
(f) Mere Silence During Questioning
§ 2.12.3 The Duty to “Scrupulously Honor” the Exercise of the Right to Silence
§ 2.12.4 Exercising the Right to Counsel Under Miranda
(a) Police Interrogation Following Assertion of the Right to Counsel—The Edwards v. Arizona Rule
(b) What Constitutes the Assertion of Miranda’s Right to Counsel
The Federal Test
The Massachusetts Test
(c) The Better Practice Is that Police Should Always Clarify Ambiguous References to Counsel
(d) Providing Information After Defendant Invokes Right to Counsel
(e) Assertion of the Right to Counsel Is Not Offense Specific
(f) Defendant Can Initiate Conversation and Waive Protection of the Edwards Rule
(g) Limitations on the Edwards Rule
(h) Assertion of the Right to Counsel May Be Selective
(i) Whether the Defendant Initiated a Resumption of the Interrogation
(j) Statements Obtained in Violation of Miranda’s Right to Counsel Are Presumed Involuntary
§ 2.13 CONSENT TO SEARCH
§ 2.13.1 A Request for Consent Does Not Require Reasonable Suspicion or Probable Cause
§ 2.13.2 Request for Consent Is Not Custodial Interrogation
§ 2.13.3 Assessing a Claim of Consent
(a) Burden of Establishing Consent Rests with the Commonwealth
(b) Reviewing Court Must Assess Two Factors—Actual Consent and Voluntariness
(c) No Warnings Are Required Before Consent Is Obtained
(d) Scope of Valid Consent
§ 2.14 AUDIO OR VIDEO RECORDING OF CONFESSIONS
§ 2.14.1 Introduction
§ 2.14.2 Special Jury Instruction Required in Most Cases if No Audio or Video Record
§ 2.14.3 Special Procedures Requiring Preparation of Transcripts of Recorded Custodial Interrogations
NOTES
Chapter 3
The Voluntariness Doctrine
§ 3.1 INTRODUCTION AND HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
§ 3.2 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MIRANDA DOCTRINE AND VOLUNTARINESS DOCTRINE
§ 3.3 MODERN FEDERAL LAW—A NARROW TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES TEST FOR VOLUNTARINESS
§ 3.3.1 The Seminal Decision in Colorado v. Connelly
§ 3.3.2 The Current Federal Due Process Test for Voluntariness
§ 3.4 MASSACHUSETTS LAW—A ROBUST TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES TEST
§ 3.4.1 Voluntariness Versus Compliance with Miranda
§ 3.4.2 The Massachusetts Test for Voluntariness
§ 3.4.3 Voluntariness Must Be Established Beyond a Reasonable Doubt
§ 3.4.4 In Massachusetts, Private and Governmental Coercion May Affect Voluntariness
§ 3.4.5 Voluntariness May Be Affected by the Condition of the Defendant Independent of Any External Coercion
§ 3.5 SPECIFIC FACTORS AFFECTING VOLUNTARINESS [AND MIRANDA WAIVERS] UNDER THE MASSACHUSETTS TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES TEST
§ 3.5.1 Introduction
§ 3.5.2 Age
§ 3.5.3 Whether Defendant Waived Miranda Rights
§ 3.5.4 Nature of the Interrogation
§ 3.5.5 Deception
(a) The Miranda Doctrine, the Voluntariness Doctrine, and the Use of Deception
Prewaiver of Rights Setting
Postwaiver of Rights Setting
(b) Massachusetts Follows an Empirical Approach
(c) False Statements About the Law
(d) The Strategic Omission of Facts Is Not Improper
(e) Deception Combined with Other Coercive Tactics
(f) The Effect of “Minimization” on Waiver of Miranda Rights and Voluntariness
“Minimization” Alone Does Not Require a Finding that a Statement Was Not Voluntary
Minimization and Other Misrepresentations Create a Risk of Involuntariness
(g) Use of the “Good Guy” Approach as an Interrogation Technique Does Not Require a Determination that the Defendant’s Statement Was Involuntary
§ 3.5.6 Threats or Assurances About the Prosecution of Others
§ 3.5.7 Promises of Leniency
(a) The Common Law Rule
(b) The Current Standard
§ 3.5.8 Encouraging Defendant to Tell the Truth as an Interrogation Tactic
§ 3.5.9 Conduct or Statements by Police Disparaging of Counsel
§ 3.5.10 Duration of the Interrogation
§ 3.5.11 Presence of Family Members
§ 3.5.12 Presence or Absence of Miranda Warnings
§ 3.6 BURDEN OF PROOF
§ 3.7 COURT’S DUTY TO CONDUCT A VOLUNTARINESS INQUIRY
§ 3.7.1 General Rule
§ 3.7.2 Strategic Choice by Defendant Not to Move for Suppression
§ 3.8 THE “HUMANE PRACTICE” RULE
§ 3.8.1 Introduction
§ 3.8.2 When Is Voluntariness a “Live” Issue?
§ 3.8.3 Duty of the Judge When Voluntariness Is a Live Issue
§ 3.9 DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO PRESENT FAVORABLE EVIDENCE TO THE JURY
§ 3.10 THE PREFERENCE FOR RECORDED INTERROGATIONS—THE DIGIAMBATTISTA RULE
§ 3.10.1 The Requirement of a Special Jury Instruction
§ 3.10.2 Commonwealth’s Right to Explain Reasons for Not Recording Interrogation
§ 3.11 RESPONSIBILITY AND AUTHORITY OF THE MOTION JUDGE
§ 3.11.1 Duty to Act Honestly, Impartially, and Diligently
§ 3.11.2 A Decision Based on the Evidence
§ 3.11.3 A Decision Faithful to the Commonwealth’s Burden of Proof
§ 3.11.4 The Duty of Recusal
§ 3.11.5 The Right to Question Witnesses
§ 3.11.6 The Duty to Supervise the Conduct of Counsel
§ 3.11.7 Duty to Make Findings and Rulings
§ 3.11.8 Motion for Reconsideration
§ 3.12 RIGHT TO PRESENT EXPERT WITNESS TESTIMONY AT TRIAL
§ 3.13 CORROBORATION RULE
NOTES
Chapter 4
The Exclusionary Rule
§ 4.1 INTRODUCTION
§ 4.2 NEW JUDICIAL FEDERALISM
§ 4.3 CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL LAW
§ 4.3.1 Involuntary Confessions Excluded Under Federal and State Law
§ 4.3.2 Test for Determining Voluntariness
(a) Federal Standard
(b) Massachusetts Standard
§ 4.3.3 Proof of Voluntariness
§ 4.3.4 Humane Practice Rule
(a) Federal Standard
(b) Massachusetts Standard
§ 4.3.5 General Rule of Exclusion for Miranda Violations
(a) Federal Standard
(b) Massachusetts Standard
§ 4.3.6 Administration of Warnings Versus Waiver of Rights
(a) Federal Standard
(b) Massachusetts Standard
§ 4.3.7 Assertion of Miranda Rights—Prewaiver Stage
(a) Federal Standard
(b) Massachusetts Standard
§ 4.3.8 Burden of Proof as to Waiver of Miranda Rights and Voluntariness
(a) Federal Standard
(b) Massachusetts Standard
§ 4.3.9 Use of Statements Obtained in Violation of Miranda for Impeachment
(a) Federal Standard
(b) Massachusetts Standard
§ 4.3.10 Rule of Exclusion for Violation of Miranda’s Right to Remain Silent
(a) Federal Standard
(b) Massachusetts Standard
§ 4.3.11 Rule of Exclusion for Violation of Miranda’s Right to Counsel
(a) Federal Standard
(b) Massachusetts Standard
§ 4.3.12 Use of Statement in Violation of Miranda to Refresh Recollection
§ 4.3.13 “Fruit of the Poisonous Tree” Doctrine—General Principle
(a) Federal Standard
(b) Massachusetts Standard
§ 4.3.14 Initial Miranda Violation, Followed by Miranda Warnings, Miranda Waiver, and Second Statement
(a) Federal Standard
(b) Massachusetts Standard
§ 4.3.15 Use of a Statement Obtained in Violation of Miranda to Obtain a Confession
(a) Federal Standard
(b) Massachusetts Standard
§ 4.3.16 Exclusion of Physical Evidence Seized on Basis of Statements Obtained in Violation of Miranda
(a) Federal Standard
(b) Massachusetts Standard
§ 4.3.17 Confession Is the Product of an Illegal Search or Seizure
(a) Federal Standard
(b) Massachusetts Standard
§ 4.3.18 Statements Derived from Unlawful Electronic Surveillance
(a) Federal Standard
(b) Massachusetts Standard
§ 4.3.19 When Counsel Seeks to Contact Custodial Defendant
(a) Federal Standard
(b) Massachusetts Standard
§ 4.3.20 Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
(a) Federal Standard
(b) Massachusetts Standard
§ 4.3.21 General Rule of Exclusion for Sixth Amendment Violations
§ 4.3.22 Waiver of the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
(a) Federal Standard
(b) Massachusetts Standard
§ 4.3.23 Massiah Doctrine
§ 4.3.24 Scope of the Massiah Doctrine
(a) Federal Standard
(b) Massachusetts Standard
§ 4.3.25 Massiah Is Not Limited to Police “Interrogation” of the Defendant
(a) Federal Standard
(b) Massachusetts Standard
§ 4.3.26 Whether Government Agents Deliberately Elicited Statements from Defendant
(a) Federal Standard
(b) Massachusetts Standard
§ 4.4 EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF TELEPHONE RIGHTS
§ 4.5 EXCLUSION OF CONFESSION OR STATEMENT BASED ON CONFRONTATION CLAUSE (BRUTON DOCTRINE)
§ 4.6 PROBATION VIOLATION PROCEEDINGS
§ 4.7 CIVIL PROCEEDINGS
NOTES
Chapter 5
False Confessions
§ 5.1 INTRODUCTION
§ 5.2 TAXONOMY OF FALSE CONFESSIONS
§ 5.2.1 Voluntary False Confessions
§ 5.2.2 Compliant False Confessions
§ 5.2.3 Contamination of Confessions
§ 5.2.4 Internalized False Confessions
§ 5.2.5 The Extraordinary Case of the Norfolk Four
§ 5.2.6 Lessons from the Norfolk Four Case
§ 5.3 CONSEQUENCES OF FALSE CONFESSIONS
§ 5.4 FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO FALSE CONFESSIONS
§ 5.4.1 Design Objectives of Custodial Interrogation
§ 5.4.2 Situational Risk Factors
(a) Length of Interrogation
(b) Presentation of False Evidence
(c) Minimization (Implied Promises of Leniency)
§ 5.4.3 Dispositional Risk Factors
(a) Age and Immaturity
(b) Cognitive and Intellectual Disabilities
§ 5.4.4 There Is No Evidence that the Miranda Doctrine Prevents False Confessions
§ 5.5 AGENDA FOR REFORM
§ 5.5.1 Electronic Recording of Custodial Interrogations
§ 5.5.2 Interrogation Practices
(a) Length of the Interrogation
(b) Presenting False Evidence
(c) Minimization Tactics
(d) Protecting Vulnerable Populations
Mandatory Counsel
Specially Trained Interrogators
NOTES
Appendix
Uniform Electronic Recordation of Custodial Interrogations Act
Table of Cases
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
J
K
L
M
N
O
P
Q
R
S
T
U
V
W
Y
Z
Table of Statutes Rules and References
FEDERAL
MASSACHUSETTS
ADDITIONAL REFERENCES AND RESOURCES
Index
A
B
C
D
E
F
H
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J
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T
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V
W


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