Philosophy is a walk on the slippery rocks. Apes, Language and the Human Mind. Sue Savage-Rumbaugh, Stuart G. Shanker and Talbot J. Taylor. Oxford University Press, New York, 1998. No. of pages 244. ISBN 0-19-510986-4.
✍ Scribed by Roger L. Mellgren
- Publisher
- John Wiley and Sons
- Year
- 1999
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 51 KB
- Volume
- 13
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0888-4080
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
✦ Synopsis
This book represents the authors' attempt to produce an interdisciplinary analysis of the bonobo language project being conducted at the Georgia State University Language Center by Sue-Savage-Rumbaugh and her colleagues.
There are four chapters in this book, and it will be abundantly clear to the reader who is the primary author of each chapter. Savage-Rumbaugh is the psychologist/researcher and her name is probably familiar to readers of this journal for her work in primate cognition/ language. She is the primary author of the ®rst and fourth chapters. The second author, Shanker, is the philosopher and primary author of Chapter 2, Philosophical Preconceptions. The third author, Taylor, is the linguist and primary author of Chapter 3, Rhetorical Inclination. The authors clearly acknowledge the division of labour in the preface of the book. They go on to state, `. . . for each chapter ± with the exception of the ®rst ± it would be exceedingly hard, even for us, to determine whose ideas, whose arguments, whose rhetorical strategies, whose form of expression are whose'. The ideas and arguments may be the equal, or at least a mixed, contribution of all authors, but the rhetorical strategies and forms of expression are clearly discipline-speci®c.
In Chapter 1 Savage-Rumbaugh gives us a behind-the-scenes look at the bonobo language project, with the focus clearly on Kanzi, son of Matata, whose achievements in language use and comprehension are truly remarkable. While this chapter and Chapter 4 contain methodological and empirical information about Kanzi and Matata, it is not the primary presentation of such information. The primary information can be found in other books and articles by Savage-Rumbaugh and her associates. This chapter is about the day-to-day activities of Kanzi and his human friends. The reader is treated to a glimpse of what its like to be friends with a non-human primate. Although we like to think of science as a purely objective, impersonal endeavour we all know that it isn't so. Chapter 1 illustrates the personal side of research as it is done with an ape. To us, Savage-Rumbaugh is a research-scientist, but to Kanzi she is a friend and companion. This chapter and Chapter 4 make a strong case for Kanzi's language abilities, especially the fact that he was not taught to use the language board, but learned about it by watching his mother, Matata, being taught, and that he understands spoken English and variations in syntax correlated with dierent meanings. This chapter is written for all and does not require an extensive background to enjoy it.
Chapters 2 and 3 are not as easily read nor understood by a psychologist. The title of this review is a line in a song by Edie Brickell and the New Bohemians, and re¯ects my own feelings about philosophical writing. It seems there are always many de®nitions, re®nements of de®nitions, interrelationships between terms and concepts, so that many times complete paragraphs have to be reread to be sure something wasn't missed or misunderstood. I found myself doing exactly that on several occasions.
The focus of the chapter is a criticism of Cartesian bifurcation ± the separation of human cognition from other animals. The critics of ape language research basically do not believe that a non-human species can be capable of human cognitive abilities and set criteria for what would have to be done to demonstrate that the ape was involved in something more than instrumental conditioning and problem solving. What Kanzi has accomplished is clearly a challenge to this Cartesian position. Shanker suggests there are at least two ways the Cartesian position can counter the Kanzi challenge. One is to not believe the data and the other is to rede®ne the point of bifurcation ± change the de®nition of what dierentiates language from pseudolanguage. Shanker ®nds neither counter acceptable, and I agree with him. The reader will have to make up his or her mind.
Chapter 3 begins with the question `Sure, but does he really understand what we say?' What Taylor addresses are issues of what constitutes scienti®c fact, or what are the data that allow us to claim something as a scienti®c fact? When Kanzi is given a command in English to retrieve an object that is out of sight, and then he complies and brings the object back, the compulsion