Cover
Contents
Acknowledgments
Introduction (João Fonseca / Jorge Gonçalves)
I. The Background
II. The Essays
Part I. Metaphysics and Personal Identity
Part II. Epistemology and Phenomenology
Part III. Cognition, Psychology, Neuroscience
Part IV. Ontology and Taxonomy
References
Part I. Metaphysics and Personal Identity
Animalism and the Remnant-Person Problem (Eric T. Olson)
Introduction
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
References
Will I ever be a Cyborg? (Rui Vieira da Cunha)
1. Introduction
2. A Cyborg Thought Experiment
3. Olson’s Animalist View
4. Back to the Cyborg
5. Conclusion
References
Part II. Epistemology and Phenomenology
How Consciousness explains the Self (Klaus Gärtner)
Justifying the Connection
What is Consciousness?
What is the ‘Self’?
The relation between a concept of Consciousness and a concept of the ‘Self’
Conclusion
References
Self-Knowledge, Introspection and Memory (António Marques)
References
Imagination as a Bodily Pattern: thinking about Sartrean’s account of Consciousness (Clara Morando)
Hypnagogic Images
References
Feelings and the Self (Dina Mendonça)
Part I: Situations and the Self
i. Situated approach to emotions
ii. Self and The Pattern of Emotional Activity
Part II: Some Emotions and the Implicated Self
i. Fear
ii. Love
iii. Pride
iv. Jealousy
Conclusions
References
Part III. Cognition, Psychology, Neuroscience
De Se Attitudes and Semiotic Aspects of Cognition (Erich Rast)
Overview
Puzzles of De Se Attitudes
Assessment of the Thought Experiments
Semiotic Aspects of Cognition
Summary and Conclusions
Figures
References
The Division of the Mind: Paradoxes and Puzzles (Vasco Correia)
1. Beyond divisionism
2. The paradoxes of the Freudian account
3. Fingarette: “ego” and “counter-ego”
4. Pears: the rival “centres of agency”
5. Davidson: the mind’s “compartments”
6. Conclusion: toward a unitary solution
References
Empirical and conceptual clarifications regarding the notion of ‘Core-Self’ from Gallagher’s and Merker’s Behavioural-Neuroscientific Proposals (João Fonseca)
I. Introduction: Conceptual Confusions and Methodological Fragmentation
II. Fundamentals of a Model-Theoretical Framework
for Behavioural Neuroscience
III. Hierarchical taxonomy of psychological concepts: introducing ‘Nested Concepts’
IV. Redefining Merker’s and Gallagher’s
proposals for Core-self
IV.1 Core-Self’ as a Theoretical Concept in
Behavioural Neuroscience
IV.2 Merker’s upper brainstem proposal
IV.3 Gallagher’s cortical motor forward model proposal
V. Conciliating Merker and Gallagher’s proposals:
‘Core-Self’ as a Theoretical Nested Concept in Behavioural Neuroscience.
V.1 The ‘Explanatory Dilemma’
V.2 Core-Self as a ‘Psychological Domain’ of BN. Introducing the ‘Nested Concept Hypothesis’
V.3 Explanatory Unification and the Overcoming of the Dilemma
Conclusion
References
Part IV. Ontology and Taxonomy
Core Self and the Problem of the Self (Jorge Gonçalves)
References
The Reality of the Virtual Self as Interface to the Social World (Robert Clowes)
Introduction
Virtual Reality and the Experience of Presence
The Virtual Self and Pre-Reflective Self Experience
The Virtual Body and the Minimal Self
In What Sense is the Self Illusory?
Presence, the Minimal Self, and Ipseity Disturbance
Schizophrenia and Social Self Diminishment
Self Positions: An Extended Virtual Self ?
Rethinking the Virtual Self: Actualizing Virtualities
The Virtuality of the Self and its Ontological Status
Actualizing Virtualities and the Conceptual Role of Self
Acknowledgements
References
Conceptual Personae of the “attentional self” (Alexander Gerner)
1. Introduction
1.1 Conceptual personae of the impossible attentional self:
Monsieur Teste as the impossible “man” of attention
2. Heautoscopic “attentional self”
2.1 Italo Calvino’s Mister Palomar’s development from an aesthetic to an heautoscopic “attentional self”
From aesthetic to heautoscopic attention
2.2 Metzinger’s “attentional ghost”: the virtual self floating out of the body and the impossible full body illusion
2.2.1 The concept of disembodied attentional self in
an out-of-body experience (OBE)
2.2.2 Virtual Out- of-body experiences and impossible
full body illusions
3. Outlook
References
Notes on Contributors