Persons and their bodies
โ Scribed by Mrinal Miri
- Publisher
- Springer Netherlands
- Year
- 1973
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 271 KB
- Volume
- 24
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0031-8116
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
โฆ Synopsis
I want, in this note, to point out certain difficulties involved in one of Strawson's though-experiments in his Individuals. This is to be found in Section 2 of the chapter on 'Persons'.
The thought-experiment is alleged to show the logical possibility of their being only one subject of experience, S, (as it were) having several different bodies (e.g. A, B, C). Let us suppose that S is a subject of visual experiences: "(1) Whether the eyelids of B and C are open or not is causally irrelevant to whether S sees; but S sees only when the eyelids of A are open... ( 2) Where A and B may be is, however, quite irrelevant to where S sees from, i.e. to what his possible field of vision is. This is determined by where C is .... But (3) the direction in which the heads and eyeballs of A and C are turned are quite irrelevant to what S sees. Given the station of C, then which of all the views which are possible from this position is the view seen by S, depends on the direction in which the heads and eyeballs of B are turned, wherever B may find himself.'1 Apart from the quite incredible difficulties that would be involved in spelling out his story in detail, Strawson would have to face the question that rises immediately to mind in view of his theory of persons: Where is the person, the entity which has the experiences? Presumably this entity is the same as S? One possible answer is that S is equally present in all the three bodies. But then persons would be too much like universals for Strawson's taste. 2 Is S uniquely associated with only one of the three bodies? If so, the very idea of the thought-experiment becomes questionable. Does S alternate its existence between the three bodies? If it does, how is one to know that it is not replaced by another exactly similar subject of experience on transit from one body to another?
This may, however, be thought to be too short a way with Strawson's story; for it ignores -so it may seem -one perfectly plausible answer to the question, "Where is S?". If we assume with Strawson, for the
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