Going beyond the present controversy surrounding personhood in various non-philosophical contexts, this book seeks to defend the renewed philosophical interest in issues connected with this topic and the need for a more credible philosophical conception of the person. Taking the theory of John Locke
Personal Identity, the Self, and Ethics
β Scribed by Ferdinand Santos, Santiago Sia (auth.)
- Publisher
- Palgrave Macmillan UK
- Year
- 2007
- Tongue
- English
- Leaves
- 337
- Category
- Library
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
β¦ Table of Contents
Front Matter....Pages i-viii
Introduction....Pages 1-16
The Lockean Account of Person and Personal Identity....Pages 17-45
Personal Identity and the Unity and Uniqueness of the Self....Pages 46-69
Charles Hartshorneβs Critique of the Ontology of Substance....Pages 70-90
The Fallacy of Simple Location and the Ontologies of Substance and Event....Pages 91-114
Methodological Considerations in Hartshorneβs Event Ontology....Pages 115-143
The Structure of an Event as Creative Synthesis....Pages 144-168
Ethics and the Mnemonic Structure of Persons....Pages 169-194
The Social Structure of Persons....Pages 195-219
Conclusion....Pages 220-226
Back Matter....Pages 227-328
β¦ Subjects
Ethics; Moral Philosophy
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