Perception as a capacity for knowledge
β Scribed by McDowell, John
- Publisher
- Marquette University Press
- Year
- 2011
- Tongue
- English
- Leaves
- 66
- Series
- Aquinas lecture 2011
- Category
- Library
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
β¦ Synopsis
Front cover; Perception as a Capacity for Knowledge (half title); Perception as a Capacity for Knowledge by John McDowell (title page); Β© 2011 Marquette University Press (copyright page); Prefatory; Perception as a Capacity for Knowledge; The Aquinas Lectures; Back cover.;Perception as a Capacity for Knowledge is the 2011 Aquinas Lecture delivered by John McDowell on February 27, 2011 at Marquette University. Professor McDowell's Lecture is the 75th in this esteemed series hosted by the Philosophy Department at Marquette. Past lecturers include Mortimer Adler, Anton. C. Pegis, Yves Simon, Jacques Maritain, Etienne Gilson, Bernard Lonergan, S.J., John N. Findlay, Alvin Plantinga, Paul Ricoeur, Alasdair MacIntyre, Louis Dupre, Myles Burnyeat, and Margaret Urban Walker. A central theme in much of Professor McDowells work is the harmful effects, in modern philosophy and in the modern reception of premodern philosophy, of a conception of nature that reflects an understanding, in itself perfectly correct, of the proper goals of the natural sciences. In a number of contexts, he has argued that we can free ourselves from the characteristic sorts of philosophical anxiety by recalling the possibility of a less restrictive conception of what it takes for something to be natural. --Provided by Publisher.
β¦ Table of Contents
Front cover
Perception as a Capacity for Knowledge (half title)
Perception as a Capacity for Knowledge by John McDowell (title page)
Β© 2011 Marquette University Press (copyright page)
Prefatory
Perception as a Capacity for Knowledge
The Aquinas Lectures
Back cover.
β¦ Subjects
Perception (Philosophy);Knowledge, Theory of;Electronic books
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