Partially efficient voting by committees

✍ Scribed by Ken-Ichi Shimomura

• Book ID: 104652959
• Publisher: Springer
• Year: 1996
• Tongue: English
• Weight: 961 KB
• Volume: 13
• Category: Article
• ISSN: 0176-1714
• DOI: 10.1007/bf00179236

✦ Synopsis

On the separable preference domain, voting by committees is the only class of voting rules that satisfy strategy-proofness and unanimity, and dictatorial rules are the only ones that are strategy-proof and Pareto efficient. To fill the gap, we define a sequence of efficiency conditions. We prove that for strategy-proof rules on the separable preference domain, the various notions of efficiency reduce to three: unanimity, partial efficiency, and Pareto efficiency. We also show that on the domain, strategy-proofness and partial efficiency characterize the class of voting rules represented as simple 9ames which are independent of objects, proper and stron 9. We call such rules votin 9 by stable committee.