โ Scribed by Peter Coughlin
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
This paper studies the Pareto optimality properties of policy proposals and electoral outcomes when there is probabilistic voting. Theorem i proves that, when the position of one candidate is taken as fixed, the other candidate will propose a Pareto optimal alternative. This implies that whenever there is an electoral equilibrium (in pure strategies) the electoral outcome is Pareto optimal. It also implies that, even if there is no such equilibirum, the electoral outcomes from a sequence of elections will be Pareto optimal (except, possibly, for an initial status quo).
๐ SIMILAR VOLUMES
In this paper, the so-called ฮท-approximation approach is used to characterize solvability (in Pareto sense) of a nonlinear multiobjective programming problem with G-invex functions with respect to the same function ฮท. In this method, an equivalent ฮท-approximated vector optimization problem is constr