University o/ Toledo
Cognitive theories assert that depressed persons' cognitions are distorted. Most of the empirical literature directly contradicts this assertion. Using a wide variety of methods to study a wide variety of cognitive processes, experiments consistently find that depressed people suffer significantly less cognitive distortion than do both normals and nondepressal psychiatric patients. It was speculated that childhood traumas predispose depression by preventing the normal formation of a defensive Screen against painful realities.
Cognitive theories of depression make two main assertions: That depressives' cognitions are relatively pessimistic and that their cognitions are distorted. To date, the former assertion goes unquestioned. However, the latter assertion was questioned by Alloy and Abramson (1979) and again by Mischel (1979). who speculated that depressives are actually more realistic than normals and cited a few experiments in support of this radical departure from cognitive theory. The present paper examines the research that relates to the truthfulness or falsity of depressives' cognitions.
Pessimism vs. Distortion
Undoubtedly, depressives' cognitions are relatively pessimistic, i.e., less optimistic than those of normals. A variety of experiments have administered questionnaires or in- ventories and have found that depressives' cognitions are less happy or hopeful than those of nondepressives. Two studies (Lapointe & Crandell, 1980; Nelson, 1977) found that depressed undergraduates endorse a lot of pessimistic beliefs; two other studies (Fibel & Hale, 1978;Prociuk, Breen, & Lussier, 1976) found that depressed undergraduates expressed more pessimism on various hope-questionnaires. Studies with patient populations have obtained almost identical results (