Oxford Studies in Metaethics 12

✍ Scribed by Russ Shafer-Landau

• Publisher: Oxford University Press;OUP Oxford
• Year: 2017
• Tongue: English
• Leaves: 334
• Series: Oxford Studies in Metaethics
• Edition: 1
• Category: Library

✦ Synopsis

Oxford Studies in Metaethics is the only publication devoted exclusively to original philosophical work in the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship being done in the field. Its broad purview includes work being done at the intersections of ethical theory with metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. The essays included in the series provide an excellent basis for understanding recent developments in the field; those who would like to acquaint themselves with the current state of play in metaethics would do well to start here.

✦ Table of Contents

Content: Cover
Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume 12
Copyright
Contents
List of Contributors
Introduction
1: Locating Morality: Moral Imperatives as Bodily Imperatives
1.1 Claims of the Body
1.1.1 Democratism as a Humeanism
1.1.2 Calls for Action
1.1.3 Bodily Imperatives
1.1.4 Bodily Imperatives as (Distinctive) Calls for Action
1.1.5 Explaining other Normative Claims using these Resources
1.2 Queer Metaethical Theory
1.2.1 Reconsidering Mackieś Challenge
1.2.2 Objectivity and Universality
1.2.3 Varieties of Prescriptivity
1.2.4 Moderate Prescriptivity, Not Lost? 1.2.5 Strong Prescriptivity, Lost1.3 Conclusion: Queering the Subject?
References
2: Difficult Cases and the Epistemic Justification of Moral Belief
2.1 Difficult Moral Cases
2.2 Objections and Replies
2.3 Consequences for Moral Epistemology and Moral Metaphysics
2.3.1 Moral Epistemology
2.3.2 Moral Metaphysics I
2.3.3 Moral Metaphysics II
References
3: Moral Testimony: Going on the Offensive
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
3.5
3.6
3.7
References
4: Non-naturalism and Normative Necessities
4.1 Non-naturalism and the Supervenience Objection
4.2 Fundamentalist Non-naturalism 4.3 Grounded Non-naturalism4.4 Essentially Grounded Non-naturalism
4.5 Avoiding Bruteness Revenge
4.6 Conclusion
References
5: The Grounding Argument against Non-reductive Moral Realism
5.1 The Supervenience Argument
5.2 Normative Supervenience
5.3 Hyperintensional Differences
5.4 The Grounding Argument
5.5 Interlude on Reduction
5.6 Normative Grounding
5.7 Amalgamating Normative Grounds
5.8 Conditional Normative Grounds
5.9 Ethical Idlers?
5.10 Conclusion
References
6: What is a Moral Law?
6.1 The Grounding Problem in Metaethics
6.2 Normative Grounding 6.3 Bridge-law Non-naturalism6.4 What is a Moral Law?
6.5 Normative Necessity
6.6 When is a Moral Law?
6.7 Why the Question Needs an Answer
6.8 A Preliminary Answer
6.9 A Better Proposal?
6.10 A Comparison
6.11 A Problem for Proposal 2
6.12 Solving the Problem
6.13 Conclusion
References
7: Ought to Is: The Puzzle of Moral Science
7.1 Introduction
7.2 Barberś Anti-Realist Strategies
7.3 Barberś Realist-Friendly Approach
7.4 Alternatives that Are Not
7.4.1 Metaphysical Priority Entails Epistemic Priority?
7.4.2 Moral Science is a Bankrupt Policy of Belief Revision 7.4.3 Inconsistent Grounds7.5 Resolving the Puzzle: A Dilemma for Moral Science
7.6 Conclusion
References
8: Disagreement Lost and Found
8.1 The Case Against MLD
8.2 The Case Against QED
References
9: Normative Language in Context
9.1 Introduction
9.2 Contextualism and Discourse Disagreement
9.2.1 Characterizing Contextualism
9.2.2 Normative Disagreement in Discourse
9.3 Managing the Context: Toward Discourse Contextualism
9.4 Deontic Modals in Discourse: The Basic Account
9.4.1 Components 1 and 2: From Formal Semantics to Interpretive Constraints

✦ Subjects

Metaethics.