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Optimal supervision with moral hazard

โœ Scribed by Yu-Hsiu Lin; Len-Kuo Hu


Book ID
116635607
Publisher
Elsevier Science
Year
2009
Tongue
English
Weight
329 KB
Volume
71
Category
Article
ISSN
0167-2681

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