<span>This book addresses the current development status of high-speed railways globally and analyzes their operational schemes and practices under emergent conditions. It covers methods and problem-solving philosophy with regard to complexity analysis, capacity evaluation, passenger-flow forecasts,
Operating Rules and Interoperability in Trans-National High-Speed Rail
β Scribed by Simon Collart-Dutilleul
- Year
- 2022
- Tongue
- English
- Leaves
- 251
- Category
- Library
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
β¦ Synopsis
This book examines the problem of interoperability related to operating rules and gives an overview of the formal method approaches related to this subject. The book examines the interoperability issues concerning implementation of European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS) while crossing a boarder. It also looks at the implementing of the ERTMS and provides solutions regarding operating rules for ERTMS lines, using formal methods and simulation tools. The contributors will also discuss operating rule validation and formal methods for safety assessment. Presents modern solutions for safety and interoperability validation; Discusses the efficiency of different tools used at different steps of the analysing process; Covers trackside infrastructure modelling, signalling and operating rule analysis.
β¦ Table of Contents
Preface
Acknowledgements
Contents
List of Figures
List of Tables
1 Introduction
1.1 Introduction
1.2 Fast Growing of High-Speed Lines Leading to NewParadigms
1.3 National Specific Rules: Framework Characterization
1.3.1 Safety Rules
1.3.1.1 Definition
1.3.1.2 Bureaucratic Rule-Writing Approach in a Dynamic World
1.3.1.3 French Point of View
1.4 National Rules and Interoperability: A Problemto be Solved
References
Part I Technological and Economical Context
2 The Performance of International Passenger Rail Transportation: A Statistical Assessment
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Statistical Assessment: Comparisons in Europeand Between Modes of Transport
2.2.1 A First Synchronous Assessment
2.2.2 A Second Diachronic Assessment
2.3 The Performance of Rail and Its Competitors
2.3.1 The Question of Cost for Rail Users
2.3.1.1 Trip Duration
2.3.1.2 Service Quality: The Punctuality, Cancellation and Security Triangle
2.3.2 The Environment, a Neglected Performance Indicator
2.4 Conclusion
References
3 Overview ERTMS/ETCS Baseline 3 and Beyond
3.1 Introduction
3.1.1 Structure of the Document
3.2 Technical Specification for Interoperability (TSI)
3.2.1 Introduction
3.2.2 Control-Command and Signalling TSI
3.3 ERTMS/ETCS System Version
3.3.1 Definitions
3.3.2 Identification/Evolution of System Versions
3.3.3 Compatibility Between System Versions
3.3.4 Coexistence of System Versions
3.4 Baseline
3.4.1 Baseline Release
3.4.2 Change Control Management
3.5 Organisation of the CCM
3.5.1 Overall Structure
3.5.2 CR Submitter
3.5.3 Board
3.5.4 Control Group
3.5.5 Core Team
3.5.6 Technical Working Groups
3.5.7 Standardisation Bodies
3.6 Change Request Process
3.7 Evaluation of a New Baseline
3.7.1 Impact of Changes
3.7.2 Evaluation of a Single CR
3.7.3 Explanatory Table for Compatibility/Incompatibility Decision Chart
3.8 Forwards and Backwards Compatibility
3.8.1 First Compatibility Assessment
3.8.2 Second Compatibility Assessment
3.9 From Baseline 2 to Baseline 3
3.9.1 Starting Point: Baseline 2
3.9.2 Identified CRs
3.9.3 Main Changes
3.9.4 Issue Date
3.9.5 Architecture
3.9.6 Summary of CRs from B2 to 3.0.0
3.10 Within B3: From 3.0.0 to 3.2.0
3.10.1 Identified CRs
3.10.2 Main Changes
3.10.3 Date of Issue
3.10.4 Summary of CRs from 3.0.0 to 3.2.0
3.11 Within B3: From 3.2.0 to 3.3.0
3.11.1 Identified CRs
3.11.2 System Version
3.11.3 Main Changes
3.11.4 Date of Issue
3.11.5 Summary of CRs from 3.2.0 to 3.3.0
3.12 Within B3: From 3.3.0 to 3.4.0
3.12.1 Identified CRs
3.12.2 Main Changes
3.12.3 Issue Date
3.12.4 Summary of CRs from 3.3.0 to 3.4.0
3.13 Within B3: From 3.4.0 to 3.5.0
3.13.1 Identified CRs
3.13.2 System Version
3.13.3 Main Changes
3.13.4 Issue Date
3.13.5 Summary of CRs from 3.4.0 to 3.5.0
3.14 Within B3: From 3.5.0 to 3.6.0
3.14.1 Identified CRs
3.14.2 Issue Date
3.14.3 Summary of CRs from 3.5.0 to 3.6.0
3.15 Beyond Baseline 3 R2
3.15.1 Article 10
3.15.2 Identified Error CRs
3.15.3 New List of Error CRs
3.15.4 Summary of (Known) Error CRs Beyond 3.6.0
3.15.5 Game Changers
3.15.5.1 Automatic Train Operation (ATO)
3.15.5.2 ETCS Level 3
3.15.5.3 The Hybrid Level 3 Concept
3.15.5.4 Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS)
3.15.5.5 Future Rail Mobile Communication System (FRMCS)
3.15.6 CCRCC ERTMS Conference 2019
3.15.7 Next TSI Release
3.16 Projects and InitiativesβEuropean R & D
3.16.1 Shift2toRail Under Horizon 2020
3.16.2 EULYNX
3.16.3 Smartrail 4.0
3.16.4 Reference CCS Architecture (RCA)
3.16.5 OCORA
3.17 Conclusions
3.17.1 In Europe
3.17.2 Outside of Europe
3.17.2.1 Africa
3.17.2.2 Asia
3.17.2.3 Oceania
3.17.2.4 America
3.18 References and Resources
4 Chinese Train Control System
4.1 Introduction
4.1.1 Development Background
4.1.2 Hierarchical Structure of CTCS
4.2 CTCS-2
4.2.1 The Main Features of CTCS-2
4.2.1.1 Information Transmission
4.2.1.2 Control Method
4.2.1.3 Control Mode
4.2.1.4 Mixed Transportation
4.2.2 Basic Functions of CTCS-2
4.2.2.1 Main Functions of CTCS-2 On-board System
4.2.2.2 Main Functions of CTCS-2 Trackside System
4.2.3 The System Structure of CTCS-2
4.2.4 The Modes of CTCS-2
4.3 CTCS-3
4.3.1 Main Features of CTCS-3
4.3.1.1 High technical Integration
4.3.1.2 High-Quality Development
4.3.1.3 Well Standardization
4.3.2 Basic Functions of CTCS-3
4.3.2.1 Main Functions of CTCS-3 On-board System
4.3.2.2 Main Functions of CTCS-3 Trackside System
4.3.3 The Structure of CTCS-3 System
4.3.3.1 Trackside System of CTCS-3
4.3.3.2 On-board System of CTCS-3
4.3.4 Operation Scenarios and Driving Modes of CTCS-3 System
4.3.4.1 Operation Scenarios of CTCS-3 System
4.3.4.2 Driving Modes of CTCS-3 System
4.3.5 The Comparison of the CTCS-3 and ETCS-2
4.3.5.1 Differences from Static Structure
4.3.5.2 Differences in the Control Mode
References
5 Modelling of High-Speed European Railway Systems
5.1 Introduction
5.2 Overview of UML and SysML Norms
5.2.1 UML: The Base
5.2.2 SysML: Addition for System Modelling
5.3 Modelling Railways and Trains
5.3.1 Component-Based Models
5.3.2 Infrastructure Modelling Using UML SysML
5.3.3 Control Modelling Using UML SysML
5.4 Industry Model-Based Modelling of Railway System
5.4.1 RailTopoModel: Modelling of Rail Infrastructure
5.4.2 Eulynx: Modelling of the Signalling System
5.4.3 IFC Rail: Modelling for Construction and Maintenance
5.5 Conclusion and Perspectives
References
Part II Proposal of a Model Engineering Approach for Border Crossing Assessment
6 Designing Operating Rules for ERTMS Transnational Lines
6.1 Introduction
6.1.1 Safety Aspects of Operating Rules
6.1.2 The Life Cycle of a Rule
6.1.3 A Model-Based Proposition
6.1.3.1 The Normative Context
6.1.3.2 Basics of the Formal Validation Process
6.2 ERTMS Operating Rule Modelling
6.3 Using the Appropriate Tools at the Appropriate Level
6.3.1 B-method and Railway Automatism
6.3.2 Modelling the Railway Infrastructure and Its Signalling System with High-Level Petri Nets
6.3.3 Issues of Producing a B-specification from a Different Formalism: A Relay-Based DSL Example
6.3.4 Industrial Example
6.3.5 Firsts Steps on Contextual Specification
6.4 The Role-Based Formalism for Rule Modelling
6.4.1 The Genesis of RBAC and B4MSecure and Their Use for Railway Safety
6.4.1.1 UML as a Starting Modelling Language
6.4.1.2 The RBAC Profile
6.4.2 Changing the RBAC Interpretation from Securityto Safety
6.4.3 Rule Modelling
6.4.4 Proposed Approach for Modelling Operating Rules
6.5 Model Verification and Validation
6.5.1 ProB Animation for Checking
6.5.2 Safety Invariant Checking
6.6 Operating Rule Synthesis
6.6.1 Dealing with Particular Cases
6.6.2 Discussion on the RBAC Profile: Present and Future Contributions
6.6.2.1 Event-B Rather Than Classical B for System Engineering
6.6.2.2 From RBAC to Or-Bac
6.6.2.3 Motivation for a Railway Specific Meta-Model Specialisation
6.6.2.4 A Multi-Component Refinement Proposition
6.6.2.5 Integrating the Requirement Engineering Tooling
6.7 Conclusion
References
7 Formal Validation of Interlocking Under Signaling Rules
7.1 Introduction
7.2 State of Art
7.3 Preliminary of Railway Safety and Interlocking System
7.3.1 Safety Management of French Railway System
7.3.2 French Railway Interlocking System
7.4 Formal Modelling of Railway Interlocking System via HCPN
7.4.1 GRAFCET and Petri Net
7.4.2 Initial Colored Petri Net Specification of Railway Interlocking System
7.4.3 A Geographical Approach of Railway Interlocking System
7.4.3.1 Signaling Operation Specification
7.4.3.2 Geographical Railroad Layout Specification
7.4.4 A Pattern of Railway Interlocking Modelling
7.4.4.1 Generalization Concept
7.4.5 An Event-Based Approach for Relay-Based Logic
7.4.5.1 Background of Relay-Based Logic
7.4.5.2 Event-Driven Concept
7.4.5.3 System Validation of Event-Based Model
7.5 Conclusion and Perspectives
7.5.1 Conclusion
7.5.2 Perspectives
7.5.2.1 Transformation from CPN to B machine
7.5.2.2 Transformation from UML to CPN
References
8 Crossing Border in the European Railway System: Operating Modes Management by Colored Petri Nets
8.1 Introduction
8.2 ERTMS Crossing Border Problem
8.2.1 The Different Modes of ERTMS
8.2.2 Transitions Between ERTMS Modes
8.3 A Multi-Model Control Problem for ERTMS
8.3.1 Supervisory Control Theory
8.3.2 Colored Petri Nets
8.3.3 Multi-Model Approach for ERTMS
8.3.3.1 Proper Component
8.3.3.2 Common Component
8.3.3.3 Switching Mechanism
8.3.3.4 Global CP-net
8.3.3.5 Semantics of the Global CP-net
8.4 Case Study
8.4.1 The Systems Description
8.4.2 CP-net Models
8.4.2.1 Operating Mode CP-net of France
8.4.2.2 Operating Mode CP-net of Country1
8.4.2.3 Global Model for the Management of Operating Modes
8.4.3 The Case Study: Simulation and Formal Verification
8.5 Conclusion
References
9 Conclusion
Correction to: Crossing Border in the European Railway System: Operating Modes Management by Colored Petri Nets
Index
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