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On secret sharing schemes

✍ Scribed by Carlo Blundo; Alfredo De Santis; Ugo Vaccaro

Publisher
Elsevier Science
Year
1998
Tongue
English
Weight
629 KB
Volume
65
Category
Article
ISSN
0020-0190

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In a secret sharing scheme a dealer has a secret key. There is a finite set P of participants and a set F of subsets of P. A secret sharing scheme with F as the access structure is a method which the dealer can use to distribute shares to each participant so that a subset of participants can determi

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AbstracL A secret sharing scheme permits a secret to be shared among participants in such a way that only qualified subsets of participants can recover the secret, but any nonqualified subset has absolutely no information on the secret. The set of all qualified subsets defines the access structure t

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In a perfect secret sharing scheme, it holds that log, I%[ > H(S), where S denotes the secret and G denotes the set of the share of user i. On the other hand, it is well known that log213 > H(S) if S is not uniformly distributed, where ? denotes the set of secrets. In this case, log, @I > H(S) < log