Nuclear Safety: A Human Factors Perspective

✍ Scribed by J. Misumi, Bernhard Wilpert, Miller, J Misumi

• Year: 1998
• Tongue: English
• Leaves: 395
• Edition: 1
• Category: Library

✦ Synopsis

For many years, as a direct result of international governmental concern, the nuclear power industry has been at the forefront of industrial safety. This text represents a cross-disciplinary look at the human factors developments in this industry, with wider applications for the entire industrial sector. Technical, psychological and social aspects of industrial safety come under the scrutiny of scientists and engineers from an array of different backgrounds. The contributors are international safety scientists from the USA, Japan and Europe, and their chapters deal with a variety of issues: from theoretical aspects of applicable cultural models, to reviews of actual safety performance in specific plants.

✦ Table of Contents

Book Cover......Page 1
Half-Title......Page 2
Title......Page 3
Copyright......Page 4
Contents......Page 5
List of contributors......Page 8
Preface......Page 19
Introduction......Page 21
PART ONE Nuclear power operations and their environment: culture and inter-organisational relations......Page 25
Introduction......Page 26
CHAPTER ONE The social construction of safety......Page 28
1.1 THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF RISK......Page 30
1.2 THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF SAFETY......Page 33
1.3 OPERATIONAL SAFETY AS A SOCIAL CONSTRUCT......Page 36
1.4 PROTECTING THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT......Page 40
1.5 CONCLUSION......Page 43
Notes......Page 45
References......Page 46
CHAPTER TWO Constructing organisational reliability: the problem of embeddedness and duality......Page 50
2.1 THE ORIGINS OF ORGANISATIONAL RELIABILITY......Page 51
2.1.2 Organisational reliability......Page 52
2.1.4 The embeddedness of organisational reliability......Page 53
2.3.2 Organisational challenges......Page 55
2.3.3 Achieving organisational reliability: the problems......Page 56
2.4 DIVERSITY OF RESPONSES......Page 57
2.4.1 Scheduling and planning an outage......Page 58
2.4.2 Cooperation between maintenance and operations......Page 60
The French context......Page 62
The US context......Page 63
2.4.4 Creating and updating maintenance procedures......Page 64
2.5.1 Arrangements and informal networks at Bugey: a necessity......Page 66
2.5.2 Rule-following at Nogent: a solid protection for contractors......Page 67
2.5.3 Compliance at Diablo Canyon: a feasible strategy......Page 68
2.5.4 Compliance and violation at North Anna: the two sides of empowerment......Page 69
2.6 ACHIEVING ORGANISATIONAL RELIABILITY: THE PROBLEM OF DUALITY......Page 70
2.6.1 Organisational reliability through autonomy and opacity at Bugey......Page 71
2.6.3 Organisational reliability through self-correction at North Anna......Page 72
2.6.4 Organisational reliability through compliance and exit at Nogent......Page 73
References......Page 74
CHAPTER THREE Finnish and Swedish practices in nuclear safety......Page 78
3.1 BENEFITS OF A COMPARISON......Page 79
3.2 THE NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAMMES IN FINLAND AND SWEDEN......Page 80
3.3 REGULATORY ENVIRONMENTS IN FINLAND AND SWEDEN......Page 81
3.4 SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES......Page 83
3.5 ONGOING ACTIVITIES......Page 85
3.6 A MAP OF SAFETY PRACTICES......Page 86
3.7 CONCLUSION......Page 87
References......Page 89
CHAPTER FOUR The cultural context of nuclear safety culture: a conceptual model and field study......Page 91
4.1 CULTURAL CONTEXT AND NUCLEAR SAFETY......Page 92
4.2 SAFETY CULTURE AND ORGANISATIONAL CULTURE......Page 93
4.3.1 Dimensions of national culture......Page 95
4.4 FIELD STUDY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SAFETY CULTURE IN NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS......Page 96
4.5 NATIONAL CULTURE: ATTENUATOR OR AMPLIFIER OF THE SAFETY CULTURE?......Page 100
References......Page 104
CHAPTER FIVE Implicit social norms in reactor control rooms......Page 108
5.1 METHOD......Page 110
5.2.2 Norms about sharing of operational responsibility......Page 111
5.2.5 Norms about passing on information to superiors......Page 112
5.3 CONCLUSIONS......Page 113
References......Page 115
CHAPTER SIX Situational assessment of safety culture......Page 116
6.1.1 Elements of culture......Page 117
1. Not all assumptions and social norms are official......Page 119
typically involve several norms that have to be balanced .........Page 120
5. Many social norms are difficult to describe verbally......Page 121
6.2 THE SITUATIONAL APPROACH......Page 122
6.2.1 Developing scenarios: the critical incident interview......Page 125
6.2.2 Other variants of the situational approach......Page 126
References......Page 127
CHAPTER SEVEN Advanced displays, cultural stereotypes and organisational characteristics of a control room......Page 130
7.1 DISPLAYS, CONTROLS, AND CULTURAL STEREOTYPES......Page 131
7.2 ORGANISATIONAL HIERARCHY IN CONTROL ROOMS......Page 135
7.3 TASK ALLOCATION BETWEEN HUMANS, COMPUTERS, AND AUTOMATED SYSTEMS......Page 136
References......Page 141
CHAPTER EIGHT From theory to practice–on the difficulties of improving human-factors learning from events in an inhospitable environment......Page 147
8.1 EVENT-REPORTING AS AN ELEMENT OF ORGANISATIONAL LEARNING......Page 148
8.2 ENHANCING ORGANISATIONAL LEARNING—THE INCLUSION OF HUMAN FACTORS......Page 149
8.3 THE ENVIRONMENT OF THE PLANT......Page 151
8.4 BEHAVIOUR OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANT OPERATORS......Page 153
8.5 UNDERSTANDING THE REASON FOR RESISTANCE......Page 154
8.6 THE MULTILEVEL LEARNING APPROACH—ENHANCING HUMAN-FACTORS LEARNING......Page 155
8.7 CONCLUSION......Page 158
References......Page 159
CHAPTER NINE Inter-organisational development in the German nuclear safety system......Page 161
9.1.1 Description......Page 162
Land ministries......Page 163
9.1.2 Central conflict issues......Page 164
9.2.1 Trans-organisational systems......Page 166
9.2.3 Inter-organisational relationships......Page 167
9.2.5 Organisational communities......Page 168
9.2.7 Inter-organisational fields......Page 169
9.3 METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS......Page 170
9.4 PRACTICAL PROBLEMS......Page 172
9.5 INTERVENTION STRATEGIES FOR IMPLEMENTING SOL......Page 173
References......Page 175
PART TWO Nuclear power operations: organisational aspects......Page 177
Introduction......Page 178
CHAPTER TEN Organisational factors and nuclear power plant safety......Page 179
10.1 INTRODUCTION......Page 180
10.2 HOW DOES THE ORGANISATION OF THE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT WORK?......Page 181
10.2.1 Organisational dimensions......Page 182
10.3.1 The Work Process Analysis Model I (WPAM I)......Page 184
Task analysis......Page 185
Organisational factors matrix......Page 186
10.3.3 Rating scales......Page 187
10.4 WHAT ARE THE SAFETY IMPLICATIONS?......Page 188
10.5.1 The use of WPAM II results......Page 191
10.5.2 Root-cause analysis......Page 192
References......Page 194
CHAPTER ELEVEN Capturing the river: multilevel modelling of safety management1......Page 196
11.1 PREVIOUS APPROACHES......Page 197
11.2 THE PROPOSED APPROACH......Page 198
11.3 IC(H)OR......Page 202
11.3.1 Links between levels: laminar flow v driving force......Page 204
11.3.2 Quantification and sensitivity analysis......Page 212
11.3.3 Generic v specific modelling of influences......Page 214
11.4 SHORT-TERM V LONG-TERM DEVELOPMENTS......Page 215
References......Page 217
CHAPTER TWELVE The effects of leadership and group decision on accident prevention......Page 219
12.1 AN INTERCULTURAL APPROACH TO UNDERSTANDING LEADERSHIP......Page 221
12.2 DEVELOPMENT OF THE PM LEADERSHIP CONCEPT......Page 222
12.3 GROUP DECISION AND ACCIDENT PREVENTION......Page 226
References......Page 230
CHAPTER THIRTEEN Are we casting the net too widely in our search for the factors contributing to errors and accidents?......Page 236
13.1 THE SEARCH FOR MORE REMOTE CAUSES......Page 237
13.2 HAS THE PENDULUM SWUNG TOO FAR?......Page 241
13.3 THE CONCEPT OF LATENT CONDITION: MINUSES AND PLUSES......Page 242
13.4 HOW CAN THE MANAGEABLE PROBLEMS BE IDENTIFIED?......Page 243
References......Page 246
PART THREE Group and individual performance......Page 248
Introduction......Page 249
14.1 A MANIFEST NEED......Page 250
14.2 AREAS OF HUMAN PERFORMANCE INDICATORS......Page 252
14.2.2 Efficiency......Page 253
14.2.3 Welfare......Page 254
14.2.4 Human error rate......Page 255
Reference......Page 257
CHAPTER FIFTEEN Predicting human error probabilities from the ability requirements of jobs in nuclear power plants......Page 258
15.1 OBJECTIVES......Page 260
15.2.2 Identification of a method for classifying tasks......Page 261
15.2.4 Selection of specific ability dimensions......Page 264
15.2.7 Task similarity and human error probability......Page 265
15.2.10 Type of ability required and human error probability......Page 266
15.2.11 Conclusions of Study 1......Page 267
15.3.1 Development of the HEP rating scale method......Page 268
15.3.3 Development of an inventory of nuclear power plant tasks......Page 269
15.3.5 Reliabilities of the ability requirements and HEP scales......Page 271
15.3.6 Relationships between ability requirements and HEP......Page 272
15.3.7 Multiple regression and replication analyses......Page 273
15.3.8 Cross-validated hierarchical multiple regressions......Page 274
15.4.1 Some limitations......Page 275
15.4.2 Some theoretical considerations......Page 276
15.4.3 Some practical implications......Page 277
References......Page 278
CHAPTER SIXTEEN Self-assessment and learning in nuclear power plant simulation training......Page 282
16.1 A CASE STUDY......Page 287
16.1.2 Results......Page 288
References......Page 295
CHAPTER SEVENTEEN Knowledge acquisition through repeated theoretical and practical training......Page 296
17.1.4 Theoretical and practical training......Page 297
17.1.6 Trials......Page 298
Causal identification......Page 300
Difficulty identifying causes......Page 301
17.1.9 Knowledge acquisition, and deep, shallow, and meta knowledge......Page 302
Team C......Page 304
Execution of anticipatory responses......Page 305
Decrease in unnecessary activation of interlocks......Page 306
17.3 CONCLUSION......Page 307
References......Page 309
PART FOUR Learning from experience......Page 310
Introduction......Page 311
CHAPTER EIGHTEEN Ab outline of human factors studies conducted by the Japanese electric power industry......Page 312
18.1 OBJECTIVES, TOPICS, AND ORGANISATION OF RESEARCH IN THE ELECTRIC UTILITIES......Page 314
18.2.2 The development of human factors databases......Page 318
Literature database......Page 319
18.3 HUMAN BEHAVIOUR PREDICTION SYSTEM......Page 321
18.4 SIMULATION OF OPERATORS’ BEHAVIOUR......Page 322
References......Page 328
CHAPTER NINETEEN Human errors in Japanese nuclear power plants: a review of 25 years1......Page 330
19.1 INCIDENTS IN JAPANESE NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS......Page 331
19.2.1 An example of J-HPES analysis......Page 333
19.2.2 Terms used in J-HPES......Page 334
Consequences of the incident......Page 335
The means for detecting an incident or inappropriate action......Page 337
19.3 SOME FEATURES OF HUMAN ERRORS IN JAPANESE NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS......Page 338
19.4 FUTURE RESEARCH......Page 340
Note......Page 341
Reference......Page 342
20.1 INTRODUCTION......Page 343
20.2 STUDY 1: ANALYSIS OF NATURAL LANGUAGE USED IN NEAR-INCIDENTS......Page 344
20.2.1 Procedure for analysis using natural language......Page 345
ing human error .........Page 346
20.3 STUDY 2: ERROR MODES AND ERROR OCCURRENCE MECHANISM OF NEAR-INCIDENTS AT POWER PLANT A......Page 350
Errors caused by an omission of action (omission errors)......Page 351
Execution errors (commission errors)......Page 352
20.4 STUDY 3: ANALYSIS OF HUMAN FACTORS USING QUANTIFICATION METHOD III......Page 356
20.5 METHODS OF PRESENTING EFFECTIVE MEASURES FOR PREVENTING HUMAN ERRORS......Page 371
20.6 DISCUSSION......Page 372
References......Page 374
CHPATER TWENTY-ONE Human factors in nuclear power plant maintenance— an empirical study1......Page 375
21.1 PROJECT OVERVIEW......Page 376
21.2.1 Maintenance support system using handy terminals......Page 378
21.2.2 Educational support tool for plant maintenance work......Page 379
21.2.3 Research on transfer of maintenance skills from veterans to younger personnel......Page 380
21.2.4 Outage maintenance information management system......Page 381
21.3 FUTURE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT......Page 383
References......Page 384
22.1 TACKLING THE HUMAN-FACTORS ASPECT OF SAFETY IN NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS......Page 385
Generator output decrease caused by degraded condenser vacuum at Ohi Unit No. 1......Page 387
Incident description......Page 388
Factors that caused error in discriminating between units......Page 389
22.3 HUMAN FACTORS IMPROVEMENT PROMOTION COMMITTEE......Page 390
22.3.1 Additional preventive measures......Page 391
Index......Page 393