North Korea, Nuclear Risk-Taking, and the United States: Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il, and Kim Jong Un (Lexington Studies on Korea's Place in International Relations)

✍ Scribed by Jihwan Hwang

• Publisher: Lexington Books
• Year: 2023
• Tongue: English
• Leaves: 217
• Category: Library

✦ Table of Contents

Cover
Half Title
Series Page
Title Page
Copyright Page
List of Tables
Acknowledgments
Introduction
Overview
Pyongyang’s Policy Changes
Pyongyang’s Initial Framing
Policy Question
Definition of Risk
Research Methodology
Within-Case Method
Case Study of the North Korean Nuclear Crisis
Causal Mechanism
Three Leaders and Multiple Observations
Outline of the Book
Notes
Chapter 1: Realism and Liberalism on the North Korean Nuclear Crisis
Realist Approach
Determined to Seek Nuclear Deterrence
Pursuing Expansionist Ambitions
Resolving Security Concerns
Criticism
Liberal Approaches
Reciprocal Behavior
Pyongyang’s Changed Nature
Criticism
Explanations by Domestic Determinants
Domestic Political Structure
History and Culture
Criticism
Explanation by Prospect Theory
Summary
Points of Agreement
Points of Disagreement
Where Does This Book Go from Here?
Notes
Chapter 2: Theorizing the North Korean Nuclear Risk-Taking: Prospect Theory
Prospect Theory and Decision-Making Under Risk
Reference Dependence
Risk-Taking Tendency: Risk-Aversion versus Risk-Acceptance
Loss-Aversion
Shifts of Reference
Probability Weighting Function and the Certainty Effect
Framing and Evaluation
Prospect Theory, Weaker States, and Foreign Policy
Framing
Strategic Interaction
Domestic–International Interactions
Weaker States
Dynamic Change in Framing
Evaluation: Choosing a Foreign Policy Option
Loss-Aversion and Status Quo Bias in the International Domain
Catastrophic Outcome and Preference Reversal
Domestic Loss-Aversion and International Risk-Taking
Summary
Notes
Chapter 3: Kim Il Sung: From Confrontation to Engagement
Framing North Korea’s Post–Cold War Domain of Action
Pyongyang’s Situation during the Cold War
Pyongyang’s Perception during the Cold War
Change of Situation and the Reference Point after the Cold War
The Soviet Union
China
North Korea’s Economic Situation
Pyongyang’s External Perception
Evaluating North Korea’s Policy Options after the Cold War
Relative Riskiness of Each Policy Option
Confronting the United States with a Nuclear Program
Engaging the United States
Relative Riskiness of Two Policy Options
Pyongyang’s Policy Decision
Reframing North Korea’s Domain of Action: June 1994
Change in Pyongyang’s International Situation
UN Sanctions
U.S. Military Strikes
Change of Pyongyang’s Perception and Risk-Taking Attitude
Pyongyang Changed Its Course of Action: June 1994
From Confrontation to Engagement
Domestic Situation and Nuclear Policy: 1989–1994
Domestic Stability
Leadership Succession
Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy
Summary
Notes
Chapter 4: Kim Jong Il: From Engagement to Confrontation
The Agreed Framework, the Clinton Administration, and North Korea: Post-June 1994
Pyongyang’s Improving International Situation
The Agreed Framework
Improving Relations between Pyongyang and Washington
Pyongyang’s Foreign Policy: Engaging the United States
Implementation of the Agreed Framework
Missile Moratorium
Reaching out to Washington
Avoiding Losses and Seeking Gains
The Agreed Framework, the Bush Administration, and North Korea: Pre-October 2002
Pyongyang’s Changing Situation: Returning to Losses
Pyongyang’s Increasing Threat Perception
The Bush Administration’s Perception of North Korea
September 11 and the “Axis of Evil”
Pyongyang’s Nuclear Policy: From Engagement to Restraint
The Collapse of the Agreed Framework: October 2002
Reframing Pyongyang’s Domain of Action: Losses
The Kelly Visit and the Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Program
Pyongyang’s Subsequent Perception of the United States
Pyongyang Changes Its Course of Action: From Restraint to Confrontation
The Second North Korean Nuclear Crisis: Post-October 2002
Pyongyang’s Domain of Action: Growing Losses
The Iraq War
Six-Party Talks
Deepening Crisis
Pyongyang’s Nuclear Policy: Deepening Nuclear Confrontation
The Six-Party Talks Agreements and Nuclear Tests: 2005–2011
Pyongyang’s Perception of Threat
The Six-Party Talks Agreements and U.S. Policy toward North Korea
The Obama Administration and Pyongyang’s Perception
Pyongyang’s Nuclear Policy: Conducting Two Nuclear Tests amid Six-Party Talks
Domestic Situation and Nuclear Policy: 1995–2011
Food Crisis and “Arduous March”: Seeking Help and Saving the Regime
Regime Stability under Kim Jong Il
Leadership Succession to Kim Jong Un
Summary
Notes
Chapter 5: Kim Jong Un: Between Confrontation and Engagement
The “Byungjin” and Nuclear Deterrence Strategy: 2012–2017
Pyongyang’s Perception: A New Leadership and the Need for Nuclear Deterrence
China and Kim Jong Un Regime
The Obama Administration and Kim Jong Un Regime
Pyongyang’s Threat Perception
Pyongyang’s Nuclear Policy: Byungjin and Acquiring Nuclear Deterrence Capability
Byungjin and Nuclear Tests
Acquiring Nuclear Deterrence Capability
Inter-Korean and U.S.–North Korean Summits: 2018–2019
Pyongyang’s Perception: Self-Confidence in Nuclear Deterrence
Self-Confidence in Nuclear Deterrence Capability
The Trump Administration and “America First”
Pyongyang’s Foreign Policy: Summits with South Korea and the United States
The Panmunjom Declaration for Peace, Prosperity, and Unification of the Korean Peninsula
Trump-Kim Summit in Singapore
Pyongyang Joint Declaration of September 2018
The Collapse of Summits and “Head-on Breakthrough”: After 2020
Pyongyang’s Perception: Returning to the Past
Between Denuclearization and Peace Regime
Pyongyang’s Perception at Hanoi and After
Pyongyang’s Foreign Policy: Returning to Confrontation
Domestic Situation and Nuclear Policy in the Kim Jong Un Era
Regime Stability under Kim Jong Un
COVID-19 and the Kim Jong Un Regime
Summary
Notes
Conclusion
Competing Explanations
Some Implications for Future Study
The Current North Korean Nuclear Crisis
Implications for Other Cases
Theoretical Implications
Note
Bibliography
Index
About the Author