In this paper, some existence theorems of equilibria for qualitative games and generalized games with an infinite number of agents with noncompact strategy sets and with/g-majorized preference correspondences are proved. Our theorems improve some recent results in the literatures.
Noncompact qualitative games with application to equilibria
โ Scribed by Shiow-Yu Chang
- Publisher
- Elsevier Science
- Year
- 2006
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 160 KB
- Volume
- 65
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0362-546X
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โฆ Synopsis
In 2003, S.Y. Chang [Maximal elements in noncompact spaces with application to equilibria, Proc. Amer. Math. Soc. 132 (2) (2003) 535-541] obtained a maximal theorem for L S -majorized correspondences in noncompact spaces. In this paper, we extend this result to obtain new existence theorems for qualitative games. Applying it, we have more refined existence theorems for both abstract economies and generalized n-person games than before.
๐ SIMILAR VOLUMES
First, we give new existence theorems for maximal elements in noncompact H-spaces, and then, as applications, the equilibrium problems in a qualitative game and an abstract economy are studied. (~) 2000 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
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