✦ LIBER ✦

Non-Additive Beliefs and Strategic Equilibria

✍ Scribed by Jürgen Eichberger; David Kelsey

Book ID: 115611157
Publisher: Elsevier Science
Year: 2000
Tongue: English
Weight: 192 KB
Volume: 30
Category: Article
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1006/game.1998.0724

No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.

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