𝔖 Bobbio Scriptorium
✦   LIBER   ✦

No pure strategy is evolutionarily stable in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game

✍ Scribed by Boyd, Robert; Lorberbaum, Jeffrey P.

Book ID
109749334
Publisher
Nature Publishing Group
Year
1987
Tongue
English
Weight
256 KB
Volume
327
Category
Article
ISSN
0028-0836

No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.

πŸ“œ SIMILAR VOLUMES

No Strategy is Evolutionarily Stable in
No Strategy is Evolutionarily Stable in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
✍ Jeffrey Lorberbaum πŸ“‚ Article πŸ“… 1994 πŸ› Elsevier Science 🌐 English βš– 704 KB

Following the influential work of Axelrod, the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game has become the theoretical gold standard for understanding the evolution of co-operative behavior among unrelated individuals. Using the game, several authors have found that a reciprocal strategy known as Tit for Tat (T

Evolutionarily Stable Strategy Distribut
Evolutionarily Stable Strategy Distributions for the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
✍ Miranda Mowbray πŸ“‚ Article πŸ“… 1997 πŸ› Elsevier Science 🌐 English βš– 186 KB

This paper introduces the idea of an evolutionarily stable strategy distribution, which generalizes the idea of an evolutionarily stable strategy; roughly speaking, an evolutionarily stable strategy distribution is a finite set of symbiotic strategies which is unaffected by low levels of mutation. T

Are There Really No Evolutionarily Stabl
Are There Really No Evolutionarily Stable Strategies in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma?
✍ JEFFREY P. LORBERBAUM; DARYL E. BOHNING; ANANDA SHASTRI; LAUREN E. SINE πŸ“‚ Article πŸ“… 2002 πŸ› Elsevier Science 🌐 English βš– 291 KB

The evolutionary form of the iterated prisoner's dilemma (IPD) is a repeated game where players strategically choose whether to cooperate with or exploit opponents and reproduce in proportion to game success. It has been widely used to study the evolution of cooperation among sel"sh agents. In the p