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Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Feedback Nash Equilibria for the Affine-Quadratic Differential Game

✍ Scribed by Engwerda, J. C.; Salmah,

Book ID
115518914
Publisher
Springer
Year
2012
Tongue
English
Weight
485 KB
Volume
157
Category
Article
ISSN
0022-3239

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πŸ“œ SIMILAR VOLUMES

On the necessary and sufficient conditio
On the necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation
✍ Tomas SjΓΆstrΓΆm πŸ“‚ Article πŸ“… 1991 πŸ› Springer 🌐 English βš– 502 KB

The purpose of this paper is to provide a constructive way of checking whether or not a social choice correspondence can be implemented in Nash equilibria. The results apply when there are two or more players. The usefulness of this constructive approach is illustrated for the case of single-peaked