NATURAL RESOURCE ENDOWMENT, THE STATE AND DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY

✍ Scribed by RICHARD M. AUTY

• Publisher: John Wiley and Sons
• Year: 1997
• Tongue: English
• Weight: 173 KB
• Volume: 9
• Category: Article
• ISSN: 0954-1748
• DOI: 10.1002/(sici)1099-1328(199706)9:4<651::aid-jid474>3.0.co;2-4

✦ Synopsis

This paper speculates that a linear causal chain runs from the natural resource endowment to the landholding system, the type of political state, the choice of development strategy and economic performance. It suggests that resource-de®cient countries tend to have peasant-dominated landholding systems which foster autonomous political states and growth-promoting economic linkages. Such countries out-perform resourcerich ones which have more varied landholding patterns which emphasise con¯icts over rents and foster factional political states and weaker economic linkages. The preoccupation with rents in resource-rich countries impedes bene®cial land reform and creates inecient industry in a counter-productive eort to create non-farm jobs. Resource-de®cient countries cannot aord such inecient transfers and pursue a development strategy which uses scarce resources more eectively.