Introduction
NOTES
1 The problem of natural agency
I. A THEORY IN SEARCH OF ITS PROBLEM
The Standard Answer: Accounting for the Action/Behavior Distinction
Locating Agency in Context: Our Ethical Perspective
What is Philosophically Puzzling About Agency? The Natural Perspective on Action
Skepticism About Natural Agency: A First Statement
Is Skepticism About Action Out of Date?
II. COMMITMENTS OF THE ETHICAL PERSPECTIVE
What Kind of Freedom of Action Does Moral Responsibility Entail?
Freedom as Satisfaction of the ”Could Have Done Otherwise” Condition
The Frankfurt Counterexamples
Moral Luck and the Condition of Control
The Condition of Control as a CDO Condition
Actions as Exercises of Control
III. COMMITMENTS OF THE NATURAL PERSPECTIVE
The ”Containment of Indeterminism” Response
Restating the Problem of Natural Agency as Independent of Determinism
The ”Dilemma” Formulation of the Problem of Natural Agency
A Radical Separation of the Problem of Natural Agency from the Question of Determinism
The ”Clash of Explanation-Types” Formulation
Assessment of the Clash of Explanation-Types Formulation
The Dennett-MayKay Complementarity Thesis
Limits of the Complementarity Thesis
An Emphatic Aside: Realism About Action
IV. THE CORE OF THE PROBLEM OF NATURAL AGENCY — AND A PLAUSIBLE SOLUTION
The Agent-Causation Formulation of the Problem of Natural Agency
Further Advantages to the Agent-Causation Formulation
The Causal Theory of Action as a Solution to the Problem of Natural Agency
NOTES
2 The value of a causal theory of action
I. A TRADITIONAL APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM OF NATURAL AGENCY
II. IS ACTION POSSIBLE UNDER DETERMINISM?
The Consequence Argument for Incompatibilism
Questioning the Main Modal Principle: Slote’s Implicit Appeal to CTA
Additional Note: Earlier Criticisms of the Consequence Argument
The Place of CTA in Compatibilist Responses to the Consequence Argument
A CTA Sufficient to Defeat the Consequence Argument Will Need to Be Deterministic
The Case Against a Specifically Deterministic Causal Theory of Action
Should Incompatibilists Seek to Reject CTA Altogether?
III. IS ACTION POSSIBLE UNDER INDETERMINISM?
Agent-Causation
Is a Probabilistic Causal Theory of Action Possible?
IV. A COMPARISON WITH DENNETT’S ELBOW ROOM
Dennett’s Negative Case for Reconciliatory Naturalism
Reconstructing the Natural Evolution of Agency: Its Independence of the Metaphysical Problem
Dennett’s Epistemologizing of the Free Will Problem
Does Intentional Systems Theory Alone Resolve the Problem of Natural Agency
V. THE CONDITIONAL ANALYSIS ARGUMENT
Problems for the Conditional Analysis Argument
Revising the CAA Strategy
The Impotence of CAA without CTA
NOTES
3 Developing a causal theory of action
I. CAUSAL ANALYSES OF ACTION
A First Approach to a CTA Analysis
Is a CTA Analysis in Terms of Reasons Even Possible?
How to Make a Positive Case for a Reason-Based CTA Analysis
A First Hypothesis for a CTA Analysis
Intentional Action and Action in General
II. THE CHALLENGE OF AKRASIA
Characterizing Weak-willed Action
Are Weak-willed Actions a Real Possibility?
How Akrasia Poses a Problem for a CTA Analysis
How to Specify the Rationality Condition for a CTA Analysis: Davidson’s Notion of an Unconditional Practical Judgment
Unconditional Practical Judgments Construed as Intentions
An Independent Argument for Admitting Intentions
The Possibility of Final Stage Akrasia
Akrasia as a Problem for CTA’s Causal Condition
NOTES
4 The challenge of causal deviance
Causally Deviant Counterexamples to CTA-H
How Deviant Cases Challenge CTA
Match with the Action-Plan as Necessary for Nondeviant Action
Making Precise the Condition of Match with the Action-Plan
The Problem of Basic Deviance
Excluding Basic Deviance: The Causal Chain Must Constitute Practical Reasoning
Excluding Basic Deviance: Causation by Virtually Concurrent Intentions
Excluding Basic Deviance: The Causal Immediacy Strategy
Excluding Basic Deviance: Volitions
May the Exclusion of Basic Deviance Be Left to Future Empirical Inquiry?
NOTES
5 Coping with basic deviance
I. THE PROMISE OF THE SENSITIVITY STRATEGY
Counterfactual and Differential Explanation Versions of the Sensitivity Condition
II. ALTERNATIVE VERSIONS OF THE SENSITIVITY STRATEGY
The Frankfurt Examples Again
The Reverse Behavioral Censor
A Problem for the Differential Explanation Version?
A Teleological Construal of the Sensitivity Condition
III. ASSESSING THE SENSITIVITY STRATEGY
Prosthetic Aids to Action
Heteromesial Causal Chains
Should a Sensitivity CTA Analysis Also Exclude Heteromesy?
Heterogeneity Among the Heteromesial Cases
Considerations About Responsibility as Reinforcing the Deviance of Preemptively Heteromesial Cases
Implications of Preemptively Heteromesial Cases for a CTA Analysis
A Consilience of Grounds for Rejecting a Sensitivity CTA Analysis
IV. SENSITIVE AND SUSTAINED CAUSATION
Sustained Causation
Servosystems and Feedback Loops
Preemptive Heteromesy Again
Appeal to the Detailed Architecture of Feedback Loops
The Final Breakthrough?
NOTES
6 Limits for the causal theory of action
I. DEALING WITH THE AGENT-CAUSATIONIST SYNDROME
The Story So Far
In What Sense Is Basic Action Primitive?
Other Aspects of the Agent-Causationist Syndrome
1. Merely voluntary action
2. Final stage akrasia
II. THE PLACE OF THE CAUSAL THEORY OF ACTION IN THE WIDER PROJECT OF RECONCILIATORY NATURALISM
A Fundamental Problem Ignored?
CTA-BI Solves the Problem of Natural Agency Only Given Natural Realism About Intentional States
How Much of a Problem of Natural Moral Autonomy Remains Once CTA Resolves the Problem of Natural Agency?
CTA and the Vindication of Moral Responsibility
NOTES
Bibliography
Index