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Nash Equilibrium and Subgame Perfection in Observable Queues

✍ Scribed by Refael Hassin; Moshe Haviv

Book ID
110402136
Publisher
Springer US
Year
2002
Tongue
English
Weight
101 KB
Volume
113
Category
Article
ISSN
0254-5330

No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.

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