๐”– Bobbio Scriptorium
โœฆ   LIBER   โœฆ

Nash equilibria in models of fiscal competition

โœ Scribed by David E. Wildasin


Book ID
113213052
Publisher
Elsevier Science
Year
1988
Tongue
English
Weight
734 KB
Volume
35
Category
Article
ISSN
0047-2727

No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.

โœฆ Synopsis


This paper analyzes

Nash equilibria in a simple model of an economy with jurisdictions engaging in fiscal competition.

Small-number Nash equilibria in which tax rates are the strategic variables are shown not to coincide with Nash equilibria in which public expenditure levels are the strategic variables. 'See Wildasin (1986, 1987) for further discussion and references.


๐Ÿ“œ SIMILAR VOLUMES