Names and the ‘de re — De dicto’ distinction
✍ Scribed by G. W. Fitch
- Publisher
- Springer Netherlands
- Year
- 1981
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 540 KB
- Volume
- 39
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0031-8116
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
✦ Synopsis
In his important paper, 'Naming and Necessity', Saul Kripke argues that proper names are 'rigid designators'J Kripke introduces the expression 'rigid designator' as follows: "Let's call something a rigid designator if in any possible world it designates the same object, a non-rigid or accidental designator if that is not the case". 2 The issue I am considering is whether proper names which denote rigidly exhibit a meaningful de re -de dicto distinction in intensional contexts. If they fail to exhibit such a distinction, then one can substitute co-extensive names in such contexts salva veritate.
An immediate consequence of the position that proper names are rigid designators is that they fail to have a meaningful de re -de dicto distinction in modal contexts, unlike other singular designating terms. Since proper names lack a meaningful de re -de dicto distinction in modal contexts, we can substitute co-extensive proper names in modal contexts salva veritate. Are there other oblique contexts which co-extensive proper names can be substituted salve veritate? In other words, do proper names exhibit a meaningful de re -de dicto distinction in non-modal contexts, such as belief contexts? Consider the following two statements:
Jones believes that Cicero denounced Catiline.
Cicero is such that Jones believes that he denounced Catiline.
If 'Cicero' is to exhibit a meaningful de re -de dicto distinction in doxastic contexts, then there must be a circumstance in which ( 1) and ( 2) differ in truth value. Thus, there must either be a circumstance in which (1) is true and ( 2) is false or a circumstance in which (1) is false and (2) is true. One can imagine the following circumstance: Suppose Cicero is standing a few feet from where Jones is standing. We ask Jones, pointing to Cicero, 'Did he denounce Catiline?' and Jones replies, 'No, Cicero denounced Catiline'. In this circumstance there seems to be a prima facie reason for believing (2) is false and (1) is true. Yet how are we to explain the apparent
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