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Multiproduct lot-size scheduling with proportional product demands

โœ Scribed by F. H. Murphy; A. L. Soyster


Publisher
John Wiley and Sons
Year
1979
Tongue
English
Weight
757 KB
Volume
26
Category
Article
ISSN
0894-069X

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โœฆ Synopsis


Abstract

In this paper we consider the multiproduct, multiperiod productionโ€scheduling model of Manne under the assumption that, across products, demands are interrelated over time. When demand requirements are proportional we show that the solution has a specific structure determined by the ratio of setup to productionโ€run time of each product. This structure holds for any length horizon and may permit a substantial (time) savings for column generation solution procedures.


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