Multi-unit auctions with uniform prices
β Scribed by Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans; Charles M. Kahn
- Publisher
- Springer
- Year
- 1998
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 367 KB
- Volume
- 12
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0938-2259
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
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## Abstract Demand reduction in Uniformβprice and English auctions are strategic reactions by participants to reduce price and thus increase potential profits. Laboratory experiments similar to the field experiments performed by List and Reiley (__Am. Econ. Rev__. 2000; **9**(4): 961β972) in which