Although interest in the theology of Karl Barth is greater today than at any time since his death, Barth's moral thought continues to be widely misunderstood. This groundbreaking study of the twentieth-century's most important Christian thinker offers the first treatment of Barth's ethics from a Rom
Morality and Metaphysics
โ Scribed by Charles Larmore
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Year
- 2021
- Tongue
- English
- Leaves
- 246
- Category
- Library
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
โฆ Synopsis
In this book, Charles Larmore develops an account of morality, freedom, and reason that rejects the naturalistic metaphysics shaping much of modern thought. Reason, Larmore argues, is responsiveness to reasons, and reasons themselves are essentially normative in character, consisting in the way that physical and psychological facts - facts about the world of nature - count in favor of possibilities of thought and action that we can take up. Moral judgments are true or false in virtue of the moral reasons there are. We need therefore a more comprehensive metaphysics that recognizes a normative dimension to reality as well. Though taking its point of departure in the analysis of moral judgment, this book branches widely into related topics such as freedom and the causal order of the world, textual interpretation, the nature of the self, self-knowledge, and the concept of duties to ourselves.
๐ SIMILAR VOLUMES
Published in 1785, the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals is one of the most powerful texts in the history of ethical thought. In this book, Immanuel Kant formulates and justifies a supreme principle of morality that issues universal and unconditional moral commands. These commands receive thei
<p><span>Solidly grounded in Chinese primary sources, </span><span>Neo Confucianism: Metaphysics, Mind, and Morality</span><span> engages the latest global scholarship to provide an innovative, rigorous, and clear articulation of neo-Confucianism and its application to Western philosophy.</span></p>